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Abstract
There have been many studies of the biology of red snapper; however, there are
few studies addressing the social dynamics of the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) red snapper
fishery1 and its effect on stock management. The GOM red snapper fishery was in
decline from the 1950s through the 1980s from years of rampant overfishing. A
rebuilding plan was established in 1984 under the Magnuson-Stevens Act guidelines,
placing stringent regulations on red snapper fishing. To successfully rebuild the fishery
by 2032, federal seasons and quotas have been shortened to allow the stock to grow.
Recreational fishermen have become increasingly unhappy with the shortening of days
on the water and have partnered with recreational interest groups to call upon the state
legislature for an overturn of management to the states and a return to magnanimous
access.
In July 2015, on behalf of the directors of the five Gulf States’ natural resource
agencies’ marine fish divisions, Congressman Garrett Graves (R-La) proposed H.R. 3094
The Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act to transfer federal management
of red snapper to each state through a quasi-governmental management authority
comprised of the directors of each Gulf State’s fish and wildlife commissions (U.S.
House of Representatives, n.d.; Appendix A). The H.R. 3094 proposal declares there will
be one management authority, the Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority, who
will create an overarching management plan for red snapper in the Gulf region, from
which the five Gulf States can then choose state-specific regulations and seasons.

11

A fishery is a unit that is engaged in the harvesting of a fish species. A unit is often
managed as a single, dependent component rather than part of a larger ecosystem-based
vi

Although federal management has greatly improved the conditions for the species over
the past few decades under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, increasing the fishery’s total annual catch limit from roughly over 6million pounds in 2007 to slightly over 12-million pounds in 20142, the Gulf States might
ignore conservation tenets, that have successfully rebuilt the fishery because the States’
preferred natural resource management ideology, the North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation, promotes lenient management, unlimited public access, and an elimination
of markets (commercial fishing).
This study uses stock assessments to establish the relative effectiveness of federal
management for red snapper to date, examines documents that reveal the Gulf States’
plans for managing red snapper, and reports key points from interviews with several
stakeholders and interest groups to reveal the agendas of those who want to shift
management of the red snapper fishery from the federal level to state control. When
asked about data collection and stock assessments, participants called for better
recreational data, fishery independent data, and more timely data. Noncompliance with
federal fishing season suggestions and recreational quota overages have led to tension
and mistrust amongst stakeholders, further widening the rift between state and federal
management.
Results show that 12/15 participants from stakeholder groups including
environmental advocacy organizations, dual-permitted fishermen, a seafood dealer, and

2

Although the bulk of discussion relates to policies pertaining to the present climate of
the fishery, this study only incorporates data up to 2014 because it is the most recently
calibrated data by MRIP and the SSC, adopted by the Council and approved by NMFS
and NOAA.
vii

federal scientists, do not support a state takeover and believe it is a hunt for access by
recreational fishermen. These participants also fear H.R. 3094 would reverse the progress
that has been made towards rebuilding the red snapper stock under the MagnusonStevens Act. Three participants, representing state and recreational interests, insist that
the stock is nearly rebuilt and that more flexible management is now possible. Although
stock assessments show that total biomass is increasing, the spawning potential ratio is
only half way to the rebuilding target and age variation within the population still needs
improvement, therefore fidelity to the recovery plan is necessary in order to reach the red
snapper rebuilding target by 2032.
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Chapter One: Introduction
The Gulf of Mexico (GOM) is a partially enclosed extension of the Atlantic
Ocean, bounded on the north by the Florida panhandle, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana; by Texas and Mexico to the west; and by peninsular Florida to the east.
Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula forms part of the southern boundary and Cuba sits in the
middle of the Gulf’s connection to the Caribbean Sea and the rest of the Atlantic. The
Gulf’s maximum east-west length is 1575 km and 900 km north-south (Darnell and
Defenbaugh, 1990). Water depth varies greatly throughout the Gulf of Mexico, with an
average depth of 5000 feet, however, near-shore water depth depends on the location and
the state. Water depth near the panhandle of Florida reaches 60 ft. immediately offshore,
while depths reach ~120 ft. off the coast of Louisiana.
The Gulf of Mexico region supports a multitude of economic activities, including
tourism and natural resource extraction (oil, natural gas, and fish). In 2012, residents of
the Gulf of Mexico region spent $1 billion on saltwater recreational fishing trips (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2014). The Gulf is home to diverse marine and coastal
ecosystems, including wetlands, estuaries, and coral reef communities; because of this,
fishing is an extremely popular pastime in the GOM region (Darnell, 2015). There are
approximately 520 species of reef fish off the Gulf coast of Florida and reef-related
tourism, including fishing, diving, and boating, generates $17.5 billion a year in the GOM
region (Heimbuch, 2011). Marine resources landings revenue from the Gulf of Mexico
1

totaled $763 million in 2012 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2014). Because the Gulf
supports such a large tourism industry and provides nearly half of the United States’
seafood, human impacts have taken a toll on the Gulf’s fish stocks (Darnell, 2015).
Overexploitation has decimated many fish stocks around the world with 77
percent of global fisheries exploited or depleted (Granek et al., 2008). Exploited means
that the number of fish born are equal to the number of fish taken out, which prevents
population growth; depleted stocks are driven down to low biological growth rates and
lower biomass than historical levels as a result of fishing pressure. According to Jackson
et al. (2001), overfishing of large vertebrates and shellfish was the first major human
disturbance to coastal environments. Although humans have utilized marine resources for
centuries, exploitation of these resources, specifically fish species, has skyrocketed in
recent years due to increased technology and greater catch per unit effort, making it
easier to extract fish quickly. The combination of increased human population, demand
for fish, and environmental stressors such as pollution, ocean acidification, and oil spills,
have led to declining fish stocks across the United States. In 2010, a cement seal on the
Deepwater Horizon, an oil well off the coast of Louisiana, failed, causing the largest
marine oil spill in history (Griffin, 2015). A total of ~4.2 million barrels of oil spewed
into the Gulf of Mexico for 87 days, causing major destruction to marine life, including
fish, birds, turtles, and submerged aquatic vegetation. The Gulf of Mexico is still
recovering from the disastrous event; nevertheless, evidence shows that fish stocks are
beginning to rebound (Griffin, 2010).
For much of U.S. history, commercial fishing operations had few, if any,
regulations. However, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has since placed
2

commercial fishing into accountability systems with management tools including
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQ), onboard observers, and mandatory logbooks, all of
which will be discussed later in this paper. Many have argued that commercial fishing
has depleted fish stocks, and perhaps they have; however, increased research into
recreational fishing impacts has shown that recreational landings now have a greater
effect on many fisheries than commercial landings due to increased efficiency and sheer
numbers (Granek et al., 2008). In the Gulf of Mexico alone, recreational anglers account
for 64 percent of total landings of stocks declared overfished or undergoing overfishing
(McClenachan et al., 2013). Impacts of recreational fishing are often underestimated
because of the perception that individual anglers have a lower impact on the environment
(Lewin et al., 2006). One angler may catch one or two fish; however, when that angler is
among 3.1 million Gulf anglers, the number of fish taken is significant (Ocean
Conservancy, n.d.).
One of these overfished species is red snapper, a popular reef fish in the GOM
region, in both commercial and recreational fishing industries. The northern red snapper
(Lutjanus campechanus) is a snapper species native to the Gulf of Mexico and the
southeastern Atlantic coast of the United States (Bester, n.d.). The fish is almond-shaped
and has a dark red appearance that fades towards its underbelly. Red snapper have long
pectoral fins, continuous dorsal fins and pointed anal fins (Figure 1). Red snapper grow
an average of four inches per year for the first six years of their lives, reaching an average
of 24 inches, and they can live up to 57 years (Jackson et al., 2007; Reichers et al., 2015).
Red snapper spawning season in the Northern Gulf of Mexico begins in May and lasts
through late September; and because red snapper are batch spawners, they can spawn up
3

to 30 times per season (Reichers et al., 2015). Larger red snapper produce many more
eggs than smaller ones (Curtis, 2014). For example, a one-year-old red snapper produces
an average of 350,000 eggs per season, while a mature 20-year-old can produce upwards
of 123 million eggs per season (Porch et al., 2007). Red snapper spawn in areas away
from reefs at depths of 60-120 feet, over flat sand bottoms (Bester, n.d.).
After spawning, eggs are buoyant and float at the surface, hatching 20 to 27 hours
after fertilization. Successful larvae settle in the water column after 20 days in areas
protected from predators, such as sharks and other large fish. Juveniles spend early life
inshore on low-relief, relic-shell habitat and migrate to deeper waters (33-620 feet)
(mostly federal waters) as adults (Geary et al., 2007). Young fish live over sandy and
muddy bottoms, while adults prefer cooler, deeper spots with cover from ledges, wrecks,
and oil platforms. Because water depths vary throughout the Gulf of Mexico region, adult
fish can be found throughout the Gulf. On the west coast of Florida, the panhandle area
near Panama City reaches depths of 60 ft. immediately off the coast, while Tampa Bay
area fishermen must travel at least 9 nautical miles offshore to reach deeper waters where
adult red snapper live.

4

Figure 1. Red Snapper (photo from Shipp, 2016).
Today, red snapper is arguably one of the most important species in the Gulf of
Mexico because of the employment that the species supports and the significance of this
fish to the seafood market. In 2014, commercial anglers in the Gulf landed more than 5.5
million pounds of red snapper, which sold dockside for $23 million (National Marine
Fisheries Service, 2015). According to the American Sportfishing Association, saltwater
recreational fishing generates ~$3.9 billion in retail sales and supports 65,212 jobs in
Florida (ASA, 2013). State and federal agencies, such as the Florida Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission (FWC) and the Federal Government’s National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), manage fisheries throughout the Gulf of Mexico, including
red snapper. In Florida, state management extends offshore to nine nautical miles, while
the NMFS manages ocean waters from 9 out to 200 nautical miles off the Florida coast
(Shuler, 2015) (Figure 2). This study will compare past state and federal efforts to
manage red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) and analyze their effectiveness at
5

managing species throughout state and federal jurisdiction. The study will also explore an
effort by some interests to have state authorities manage federal waters.

Figure 2. State Marine Jurisdictional Boundaries. This figure depicts the state and
federal water boundaries of the five states in the Gulf of Mexico. (Reichers et al., 2015)

Natural Resources Management
Natural resources are often defined as “resources that are derived from the Earth,
biosphere or atmosphere and that exist independently of human activity,” although
resources are human-centered by their very nature because they have utility to people
(Cutter and Renwick, 1999, 1). Natural or environmental resources are stocks of
substances found naturally and their quantities are sometimes fixed or finite (Mather and
Chapman, 1995). Scientists classify resources into two major categories: renewable and
non-renewable (Chiras and Reganold, 2010). Renewable resources (such as wild animals,
groundwater, and forests) are those that can be continuously harvested with proper
planning and management. Improper use/management may result in the exhaustion of
6

renewables, leading to negative social and economic effects. Non-renewable resources
(such as fossil fuels and metals) form so slowly, that for all practical purposes, they may
be considered finite. Red snapper are a slow-growing species, reaching sexual maturity
at five years old, so despite being a renewable resource, these fish require careful
management or their stocks could be depleted. Human perception of resources affects
their perceived usefulness or value, which leads to the idea that environmental resources
can be created, destroyed or rendered useless by changing human perceptions and
technology (Mather and Chapman, 1995). Factors that affect this perception include
cultural-evaluation, view of nature, social change, economic and technological factors,
and resource scarcity, because of the resources’ preciousness or due to human
overexploitation (Cutter and Renwick, 1999).
The debate over state and federal management of red snapper in the GOM is a
relatively recent part of a long-standing and wide ranging conflict over natural resources
management in the United States. In the early twentieth century, sharp disagreement
raged between preservationists, who demanded that some landscapes and resources be set
aside for passive recreation (or no use at all)—and conservationists, who believed that all
resources should be put to maximum use for the benefit of as many people as possible
(Mather and Chapman, 1995). Conflict between preservationists and those who insist
upon use of resources continues today. Because of fundamental philosophical
disagreements to management approaches, which have never been entirely resolved,
natural resource management is often influenced by each decision maker’s preferred
ideology, whether conservation or preservation, or state vs. federal management (Cutter
and Renwick, 1999).
7

On top of the preservation/conservation divide, there is disagreement about which
level of government should manage natural resources. The fight over resource
management authority has existed for decades, and the red snapper management dilemma
is just one of many recent examples. Much like red snapper, in the 1970s, leaders in
several Western states launched the Sagebrush Rebellion, a war of words in which
Western governors and other states’ rights advocates demanded more autonomy over, and
access to resources, in the vast amount of federal land available in most Western states
(Cawley, 1993). The Red Snapper Saga can be viewed as a recent, marine resources
iteration of the Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s. The federal government currently owns
~600 million acres of land in the western United States (Wald et al., 1982). This public
land has natural resources (wildlife, oil shale, coal, timber, grass and so forth) that private
interests wish to exploit. The passage of environmental laws in the 1970s, such as the
Endangered Species Act, Wilderness Act, and the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act, initiated strict management of federal western lands by the Bureau of Land
Management. Moreover, due to overgrazing, the federal government reduced the number
of animals allowed on public lands. Westerners questioned the validity of the Bureau of
Land Management’s carrying capacity measurements that forced ranchers to reduce their
herd sizes (Thompson, 2016).
When the federal government reduced private interests’ access to natural
resources on public land, westerners objected loudly to what they perceived as a heavyhanded federal government. In 1979, state legislatures in Nevada, Utah, Wyoming,
Alaska, Oregon, and Arizona introduced bills demanding the transfer of land, or at least
management of federal land, to the states (Thompson, 2016). Ronald Reagan, in 1980 as
8

a presidential candidate, openly supported the rebels and when he was elected, appointed
James Watt as Secretary of the Interior. Watt advocated for property rights and also
supported the rebellion; when the Reagan era began, Watt rolled back strict, federal
environmental regulations instituted previously by the Carter administration. After this
rollback in 1981, the rebellion simmered and supporters grew quieter, realizing the
transfer of land management would cost states millions of dollars, which would then
trickle down to the taxpayers (Nelson, 1984). Additionally, the rebels recognized that the
proposed bills had little to no legal basis and would not survive in Congress.
The Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s and early 1980s was not the first
occurrence of states fighting for control of public land and resources, nor would it be the
last. State versus Federal power struggles in the West date back at least to Theodore
Roosevelt’s presidency (1901-1909), when lands were set aside for national parks and
forests (Wald et al., 1982). Following the Sagebrush Rebellion, the Wise-Use Movement
emerged in Nevada in 1988, calling for increased access to, and development of, federal
lands and natural resources (Burke, 1993). Supporters of the Wise-Use agenda argued
that regulations protecting natural resources on private property constituted “takings,”
when in reality they desired unrestricted access to resources on federal lands (St. Clair et
al., 2016). In early 2016, a group of armed militiamen occupied Malheur National
Wildlife Refuge in Oregon to protest the federal government and the perceived
mistreatment of western ranchers, while preventing U.S. Fish and Wildlife staff from
performing their duties (Siegler, 2016). The occupation lasted 41 days and ended with
one fatality and the arrest of twenty-six protestors. A criminal trial in October 2016
resulted in the acquittal of seven defendants, including the two organizers, while a more
9

recent trial of four others concluded with two being found guilty of conspiracy
(Bernstein, 2016). Despite the odd outcome of the occupation, Malheur sparked the most
recent battle for reduced federal authority and arguably the revival of the Sagebrush
Rebellion.
Gulf States have much less federal land but they front the vast common property
resources of the Gulf of Mexico, and many private interests are demanding increased
access to these resources. Similarly, in 2009, several hundred fishers from the
Northeastern U.S. protested the federal government’s reduced catch limits intended to
reduce overfishing; and in early 2010, fishers from around the country gathered in
Washington, D.C. to protest fishing restrictions established by federal fisheries managers
to rebuild fish stocks (Associated Press, 2009; Phillips and Shutak, 2010). Recreational
fishermen are worried about the loss of access to fishery resources resulting from
stringent federal restrictions intended to curb overfishing. To increase recreational fishing
opportunities and to possibly eliminate commercial fishing altogether, the Gulf States are
pushing for increased management authority over red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico.
In order to understand the current struggle to manage red snapper, it is important
to address the history of state fish and game commissions. According to Halverson’s The
Entirely Synthetic Fish (2010), states created these commissions after the Civil War, and
they were funded through each state treasury. As state budgets shrunk in the 1880s, states
relied more upon hunting and fishing licenses to fund state-level wildlife conservation
activities. After World War II, fishing became increasingly popular, both recreationally
and commercially, and war ships were transformed into commercial fishing boats
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(Shuler, 2015). The influx of recreational fishermen and commercial fleets brought
much-needed revenue to the states.
In 1937, the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, or the Pittman-Robertson
Act, created an 11% excise tax on sporting arms and ammunition, which the Secretary of
the Interior allocates to the states for the management and restoration of wildlife (FWS,
2013A). Similarly, States receive funds from anglers’ participation in the fishing supplies
market. Modeled after the Pittman-Robertson Act, the Federal Aid in Sport Fish
Restoration Act, or the Dingell-Johnson Act, of 1950 established a 10% excise tax on all
motorboat fuel and fishing equipment sold in the U.S., which Congress allocates to each
state’s fish and game commission (FWS, 2013B). A 1984 amendment to the DingellJohnson Act created the Wallop-Breaux Aquatic Resources Trust Fund, through which
Congress allocates funds generated through excise taxes on previously untaxed sport
fishing equipment sales. According to the American Sportfishing Association’s
“Sportfishing in America” report (2013), the excise taxes from the Dingell-Johnson Act
generated $390 million for conservation efforts in 2010.
Natural resource agencies are staffed with people committed to protecting public
goods; however, they are stuck with a funding model that encourages them to sell more
hunting and fishing licenses, therefore commodifying the resource that goes against part
of the Seven Sisters principles of conservation listed below. Increased population and
demand for fish resources, as well as more licensed hunters and fishers, places more
pressure on the fish and wildlife resources they are committed to protecting. Because red
snapper drives a valuable market for the Gulf States’ commercial and recreational
cultural and fishing interests and the tourism industries that they serve, agencies,
11

including Florida’s Fish and Wildife Conservation Commission (FWC), may be reluctant
to apply stringent restrictions on the already overexploited resource (Geist and
McTaggart-Cowan, 1995).
State agencies push for increased access to fisheries while preventing resources
from being exploited for monetary gain, yet the states and recreational leadership claim
that recreational fishing is a greater economic driver than commercial fishing (Participant
15, personal communication, Nov 7; Geist and McTaggart-Cowan, 1995). Individual
Fishing Quotas (IFQ) provide commercial fishermen with the privilege to harvest a share
of an annual, pre-determined total allowable catch (TAC), which contributes to national
food security by supplying foodstuffs for Americans that do not have direct access to the
Gulf. Yet, recreational fishermen argue that the commercial industry only supplies food
for the upper class because red snapper is considered a delicacy in the restaurant business
(Solis et al., 2014). The IFQ program encourages fishermen to adjust their operations to
increase profitability and to reduce excess harvesting (Solis et al., 2014). Since its
implementation in 2007, the IFQ system has been instrumental in rebuilding the red
snapper fishery in spite of increased pressure from the recreational sector. Contrary to the
results of the Red Snapper Commercial IFQ system, according to McTaggert-Cowan
(1995), the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation suggests that enhanced
commercialization of fish and wildlife, especially in the form of IFQs, will harm species
restoration efforts and reduce access to the resource.
Privatization is defined by state agencies and the recreational sector as
transferring wildlife from the public trust to private entities (Geist and McTaggart12

Cowan, 1995). An Individual Fishing Quota program, like the red snapper IFQ, is an
example of a catch share program, defined by the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) as “allocat[ing] a specific portion of the total allowable fishery catch to
individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities.” Catch share programs,
including IFQs and tag systems, are a way for the NMFS to provide flexible access to
resources, while encouraging long-term economic and ecological sustainability (NOAA,
n.d.A, i). Recreational fishermen believe red snapper are privatized because the catch
share program ensures certain individuals “rights” to the fish stock. Although recreational
fishermen argue that Individual Fishing Quotas are an example of privatization, the IFQ
system is not truly privatization because any fishermen can enter the fishery by
purchasing shares from existing members. Commercial landings also provide food to the
public, specifically to those who cannot access the resource. For the purposes of this
paper, IFQ’s and tag systems will be referred to as catch share programs, rather than
systems of privatization, however the word privatization will be defined using the
recreational and state definition.
The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation emerged as a result of the
efforts of hunters and anglers in the mid-1800s and was ultimately formalized by Dr.
Valerius Geist, Professor Emeritus of Environmental Science, in 1995 (Organ et al.,
2012). According to Organ et al., the model centers around seven principles, known as
the Seven Sisters for Conservation. These principles, when applied together, have
resulted in major successes in wildlife conservation and management in the U.S. and
Canada. The seven principles are as follows:
13

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Wildlife resources are a public trust.
Markets for game should be eliminated.
Allocation of wildlife is by law.
Wildlife can be killed only for a legitimate purpose.
Wildlife is considered an international resource.
Science is the proper tool to discharge wildlife policy.
Democracy of hunting is standard.

Several of these principles pertain to the struggle between state and federal red snapper
management authority because they address public access, commercial fishing, resource
allocation, and scientific data collection. The first principle, ‘wildlife resources are a
public trust,’ demands that such resources on public lands or waters managed by
government agencies, are kept wild and made available for current and future
generations. One view of the Public Trust Doctrine3 deems the government responsible
for the care of wildlife, fish, and waterways, and places ownership in the hands of
citizens in the form of opportunity to access these resources for traditional purposes,
including fishing and hunting (Batchellor et al., 2010). This view asserts that claiming
ownership of wildlife as private property, thus limiting access to and use of wildlife, are
threats that undermine and inhibit sound conservation practices (Batchellor et al., 2010).
Recreational fishermen believe this principle has been violated through the privatization
of the commercial sector. Recreational fishermen, specifically sportfishermen, have used
the Public Trust Doctrine as a means to argue against the restriction of access, such as
marine reserve closures or quotas and bag limits (Bevis, 2005). The use of the Doctrine

3

The Public Trust Doctrine is a principle of common law that establishes a trustee
relationship of government to hold and manage wildlife, fish, and waterways for the
benefit of the resources and the public.
14

by recreational interests to argue for equal rights to access the fishery is misguided as it
excludes commercial fishing and charter for hire. Recreational fishermen are given the
privilege to access the fishery through quotas and seasons; however, no fishermen are
given individual rights to the fish. The charter for-hire and the commercial fleets are
given explicit privileges to allow the non-boat owning and seafood-consuming public fair
access to the resource.
Allocation of fish or wildlife (such as through an IFQ), the third principle, is
applied and enforced by laws created through a public process. Any allocation of fish and
wildlife that is accomplished by anything other than a public process would violate this
principle. This thesis will ultimately consider proposed red snapper management
legislation in Congress that could very well abandon a truly public process for allocating
red snapper.
The final relevant principle is the belief that sound science is vital for effective
fish and wildlife policy. Currently, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council uses
the Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) to sample anglers for information
regarding how often they are fishing (effort) and what they are catching per trip (catch
rate), which is combined with biological surveys and commercial data to estimate the
total catch of selected species (NOAA, n.d.B). Biologists survey anglers in person and by
telephone, however it is impossible for them to reach every angler. Because of this,
MRIP analysts use statistical models to extrapolate from survey data on recreational catch
to inform management decisions. Although data is not faultless, federal fisheries
managers practice best-available science through transparency, including marginal error
calculations and reporting strengths and weaknesses of each assessment in an advisory
15

report. As technology advances and new information emerges, fisheries management
works towards bettering assessment methods.
Problem Statement
This study focuses on GOM red snapper, a controversial species. The GOM red
snapper fish stock suffered a major decline from rampant overfishing from the 1950s
through the 1980s due to the increase in recreational fishermen joining the fishery after
World War II. Following the first stock assessment in 1988, the National Marine
Fisheries Service declared the stock overfished (Shuler, 2015). After the Gulf’s red
snapper fishery decline became apparent in the 1980s, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council developed a fishery management plan in 1984 to allow the Gulf’s
red snapper stock to replenish. In order for the stock to rebound, in 1984, the Gulf
Council established minimum size limits and bag limits for both the recreational and
commercial sectors. In addition, season lengths allow the Council to manage how quickly
fishermen reach the quota based on catch per unit effort, which is influenced by size and
bag limits of red snapper. If the Council sets an annual catch limit (ACL) of 12 million
pounds (mp) for example, with a 2 fish bag limit per person, at 16 inches minimum size
limit, they can calculate how quickly fishermen will catch the allotted poundage with
these numbers and determine the season length. Red snapper season usually occurs in
June because this is historically when the highest percentage of fish is caught and when
the most socio-economic activity occurs in the GOM.
In 2007, the commercial sector adopted an IFQ program that allows permitted
fishermen to harvest an allocated amount of the commercial quota in federal waters,
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eliminating competition and the race to find the remaining fish before others harvest
them. Before the IFQ system, there was no system of accountability for the commercial
sector, therefore the IFQ program greatly reduced the commercial fishermen’s quota
overages and success ultimately allowed their allocation to be increased from 2.04 mp
(1991) to 3.3 mp (2007) and then to 6.7 mp (2015) (GMFMC, 2016). The recreational
sectors’ allocation has also increased since, from 2.45 mp (2008) to 3.86 mp (2010) to
5.39 mp (2014) (Table 1). However, private recreational fishermen have exceeded their
quota almost every year since the stock rebuilding plan began, sometimes by over 144%
a year, angering their fishing counterparts in the commercial sector (Figures 3 and 4).
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Figure 3. Commercial Allocation and Landings of Red Snapper in the Gulf of
Mexico (1991-2014). This graph depicts the commercial sector’s quota and landings for
1991-2014. Quota and Landings measured in million pounds, whole weight. (GMFMC,
2016)
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Recreational Allocation and Landings of Red Snapper in the
Gulf of Mexico (1991-2014)
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Figure 4. Recreational Quota and Landings of Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico.
This graph depicts the recreational allocation and landings from 1991-2014. Quota and
Landings measured in million pounds, whole weight. (GMFMC, 2014)
Table 1. Recreational and Commercial Quota, Landings, and % of Quota (19912014). This table depicts the recreational and commercial quota, landings, and % of quota
filled between 1991, when both sectors had quotas instituted, through 2014. Highlighted
percentages are quota overages. (GMFMC, 2014; Cass-Calay et al., 2015)

Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Rec
Landings
(mp)
2.917
4.618
7.161
6.076
5.464
5.339
6.804
4.854
4.972
4.75
5.252
6.535
6.105

Rec
Quota
(mp)
1.96
1.96
2.94
2.94
2.94
4.47
4.47
4.47
4.47
4.47
4.47
4.47
4.47

Rec % of
Quota
149%
236%
244%
207%
186%
119%
152%
109%
111%
106%
117%
146%
137%
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Comm
Landings
(mp)
2.213
3.106
3.374
3.222
2.934
4.313
4.81
4.68
4.876
4.837
4.625
4.779
4.409

Comm
Quota
(mp)
2.04
2.04
3.06
3.06
3.06
4.65
4.65
4.65
4.65
4.65
4.65
4.65
4.65

Comm %
of Quota
108%
152%
110%
105%
96%
93%
103%
101%
105%
104%
99%
103%
95%

Table 1. Recreational and Commercial Quota, Landings, and % of Quota (19912014). (continued)
2004
6.46
4.47
145%
4.651
4.65
100%
2005
4.676
4.47
105%
4.096
4.65
88%
2006
4.131
4.47
92%
4.649
4.65
100%
2007
5.809
3.185
182%
3.153
3.315
95%
2008
4.056
2.45
166%
2.461
2.55
97%
2009
5.597
2.45
228%
2.461
2.55
97%
2010
2.651
3.403
78%
3.362
3.542
95%
2011
6.734
3.866
174%
3.562
3.664
97%
2012
7.524
3.959
190%
4
4.121
97%
2013
9.639
5.39
179%
5.399
5.61
96%
2014
3.826
5.39
71%
5.568
7.293
76%

According to stock assessment reports, total biomass is predicted to increase,
demonstrating that the rebuilding plan and management choices have been relatively
successful thus far (Figure 5). Both fisheries managers and fishermen have discovered a
paradox: the recent appearance of larger fish is a sign that restrictions are working and
they enable fishermen to fill their quotas quicker. Yet recreational fishermen are unhappy
with limited access to the resource, because it appears as if red snapper have rebounded.
Accordingly, in July 2015, on behalf of the directors of the five Gulf States’ natural
resource agencies,4 Congressman Garrett Graves (R-La) proposed H.R. 3094 The Gulf
States Red Snapper Management Authority Act to transfer federal management of red
snapper to the states because of the recreational sector’s dissatisfaction with federal
management (U.S. House of Representatives, n.d.). Graves introduced H.R. 3094 as a
result of the partnership between recreational fishermen and special interest groups such

4

Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,
Mississippi Department of Marine Resources, Alabama Department of Conservation and
Natural Resources, and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.
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as the Coastal Conservation Association, American Sportfishing Association, and the
Center for Coastal Conservation; and the bill includes provisions that could reduce
commercial fishing by 10% each year without review. The proposed state management
scheme offers less restrictive regulations for recreational fishers and an uncertain future
for the commercial sector. Because federal fisheries are currently bound by the protective
Magnuson-Stevens Act, the nation’s most important fisheries management law, some
observers are concerned that state management will be insufficient to protect the species
(Lallo, 2015A).
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Figure 5. Predicted Total Biomass of Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. This graph
depicts the predicted total biomass (metric tons whole weight) of red snapper in the Gulf
of Mexico from 1950 to 2011. (SEDAR, 2013).
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Research Question and Objectives
Some studies (Tokotch et al., 2012; Rossiter et al., 2015) have focused on
stakeholder involvement in fisheries management, however there are few studies
(Doerpinghaus et al., 2014; Cullis-Suzuki et al., 2011) addressing the social components
(stakeholder perceptions and management actions) of the red snapper fishery. Red
snapper is an economically, recreationally, and intrinsically valuable species in the Gulf
of Mexico, garnering much public attention. As a result, a study exploring the motives
behind the effort to eliminate federal management of this important species in the Gulf is
vital. The overall objective is to investigate the following research question, “what is
driving the Gulf States to push for state management of red snapper, despite the fact that
federal management has demonstrably helped this fish recover?” Additional queries
revolve around how the red snapper fishery management plan has executed the mandates
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, as well as how management mechanisms have affected the
relationship between management authorities such as the NMFS and Florida’s FWC.
Conceptual Framework
This study employs the Federal vs. State analysis framework model for natural
resources management (Cawley, 1993). This framework is based on the federal
government’s strict regulatory policies for natural resource access in public lands, as
opposed to the less stringent/open access ideologies advocated by some users.
Stakeholders’ differing management ideologies are at the core of the battle over red
snapper, with the federal government practicing proactive conservation management that
restricts access as directed by the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and the states—cloaking their
desire to increase access to the resource by using tenets of the North American Model of
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Wildlife Conservation. The battle between conservation and the desire for open access is
also exemplified by the Sagebrush Rebellion and western ranchers’ fight for access to
federal grazing lands. During the first half of the twentieth century, the federal
government promoted resource development through managed use, which allowed users
access to resources on public land (Cawley, 1993). After World War II, the U.S.
population became more interested in outdoor recreation, which paved the way for public
use of nature and policies to protect and manage these landscapes (Cawley, 1993).
In the 1970s, the emergence of conservation-driven federal policies for natural
resource management placed conservation of natural resources before development and
exploitation. During the 1960s and 1970s, as Congress considered and then passed
several important environmental protection laws including the Clean Air Act, Clean
Water Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act, the U.S. government applied
more restrictive environmental regulations to public land and marine resources—
including the Magnuson-Sevens Act. Meanwhile, public land users pushed for greater
state control, reduced federal involvement—and expanded access. Reduced access to
natural resources in the West and a shift in policy widened the gap between the federal
government (based in the east) and Western states because Westerners perceived these
actions as punishment rather than conservation (McCarthy, 1992). Red snapper are
currently managed according to a no-nonsense rebuilding plan that allows some access
for fishermen while instituting limits that allow the stock to repopulate, including bag
limits, size restrictions, and seasons. The conceptual framework of this study (analysis of
Federal vs. State approaches to natural resource management) traces the impact of a
changing definition of conservation and subsequent new approaches to natural resource
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management by analyzing changes in red snapper management and in the perspectives of
many different stakeholders. Current management of the red snapper fishery is based
upon efforts by the federal government in the 1970s (expressed in the Magnuson-Stevens
Act of 1976) to curb overexploitation and ensure availability of marine resources for
future generations. The proposed legislation by the five Gulf States to expand access to a
recovering fishery reflects the efforts by Western state legislatures in the 1970s to
increase access to resources on federal government property in the West.
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Recent Interation of Sagebrush
Rebellion: late 1970s/early 1980s
Who should/How to Manage Red
Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico?

Red Snapper
Rebellion?
Federal Government:
National Marine
Fisheries Service
Magnuson-Stevens
Act 1976;
Sustainable Fisheries
Act 1996; 2007 MSA
Reauthorization:
promotes best
available science,
stock recovery plans,
restriction of access
while stock recovers

Red Snapper
Fishery
Management Plan
1984: target
recovery 2032

State vs. Federal:
Competing Fish and
Wildlife Resource
Management
Ideologies
Sustainable Access
vs. Unlimited
Exploitation

Conducted Interviews
with 15 particpants from
stakeholder groups to
gauge attitude towards
H.R. 3094 and current
red snapper Vishery
management plan

Supporters of H.R. 3094:
State Employees and
Recreational Fishers and
their Advocates

Opponents of H.R. 3094: DualPermitted Fishermen, Charter
Fishermen, Commercial
Fishermen, Seafood Dealer,
Environmental Advocacy
Organizations, State and
Federal Scientists

Figure 6. Conceptual Framework of This Thesis.
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Gulf States: Fish and
Wildlife Commissions
of FL, AL, MS, LA, and
TX

States promote
principles of North
American Model of
Wildlife
Conservation:
especially public
trust doctrine,
allocation through
public process,
scientiVic data
collection and
management

H.R. 3094 The Gulf States
Red Snapper Management
Authority Act

Chapter Two: Literature Review
U.S. Fisheries Management
Prior to 1976, states handled all U.S. fisheries management. The Submerged
Lands Act of 1953 clarified that each state is responsible for managing offshore lands
beneath navigable waters, including all natural resources (U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy, 2004). This legislation allows states to manage marine resources up to three
nautical miles from their shores (nine nautical miles in Florida and Texas), without
requiring a management scheme similar to neighboring states. Before the formal zoning
system, Florida and Texas waters were defined as 3 leagues, which equals 9 nautical
miles, and was never changed. In 1973, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III) convened to discuss concerns about declining fish stocks and
each nation’s jurisdiction of coastal waters (U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004).
Early proceedings of UNCLOS III revealed a consensus among coastal nations that there
should be sovereign rights to fish resources out to 200 nautical miles from each nation’s
coast (U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004). Unsatisfied with the UNCLOS III’s
relative lack of progress, the U.S. Congress developed the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act in 1976 to combat declining fish resources.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) established a modern federal system for
managing fisheries in the United States (Dell’Apa, 2012). Under the MSA, the federal
government assumed responsibility for fisheries occurring between three nautical miles
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(nine off Florida and Texas) up to 200-nautical miles offshore, an ocean region known as
the exclusive economic zone. Congress created exclusive economic zones to rid national
waters of foreign fishing vessels and to secure the country’s waters from foreign threats.
The MSA also created eight Regional Fishery Management Councils (RFMCs) to
divide jurisdiction for the nations’ ocean waters among eight marine regions. There are
17 voting members on the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (GMFMC or the
Council), representing a broad reflection of the GOM fisheries’ stakeholders. The current
GMFMC makeup includes the Southeast Regional Administrator of the NMFS, the five
directors of the Gulf state marine resource management agencies, and 11 members
nominated by the five Gulf state governors and appointed by the Secretary of Commerce
(Dell’Apa, 2012). Florida has three representatives representing commercial, recreational
and environmental interests.
The Council meets publicly five times a year around the Gulf region to craft and
discuss amendments to fishery management plans, hear public comment, and take final
actions on proposed amendments. Stakeholders are encouraged to get involved in the
decision making process through a designated commenting period that allows them to
read proposed amendments and offer their opinions to the Plan Coordinator. Furthermore,
the MSA provides a level of transparency due to the regional council process, but also by
making all council recommendations subject to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). NEPA encourages transparency of federal activities and mandates agencies to
account for environmental impacts that may result from federal projects (infrastructure
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construction and regulation). This act also requires agencies to publish environmental
impact statements and make them available for public review before project finalization.
These regional councils are responsible for creating fishery management plans
(FMPs) for most aquatic species that abide by the MSA’s ten national standards to
encourage conservation of fish species:
1. Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on
a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing
industry.
2. Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific
information available.
3. To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit
throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close
coordination.
4. Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between residents of
different states. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among
various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be (a) fair and equitable to all such
fishermen; (b) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and (c) carried out in such
manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive
share of such privilege.
5. Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider efficiency
in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall have economic
allocation as its sole purpose.
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6. Conservation and management measures shall take into account and allow for
variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches.
7. Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize costs and
avoid unnecessary duplication.
8. Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation
requirements of this Act (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of
overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing
communities by utilizing economic and social data that meet the requirement of
paragraph (2) [i.e., National Standard 2], in order to (a) provide for the sustained
participation of such communities, and (b) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse
economic impacts on such communities.
9. Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (a) minimize
bycatch and (b) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such
bycatch.
10. Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, promote the
safety of human life at sea.

All FMP amendments adopted by the regional councils are sent to the NMFS for a review
of compliance with the MSA; the NMFS, through the Office of Law Enforcement, is
ultimately responsible for enforcement of the Magnsuon-Stevens Act, Endangered
Species Act, and more than 35 other federal statutes in federal waters (Dell’Apa, 2012;
U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004). The Secretary of Commerce reviews all plans,
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regulations, and amendments to ensure these national standards are reflected in each
regional council’s fishery management plans (NOAA Fisheries, n.dA).
The Magnuson-Stevens Act defines maximum sustainable yield (MSY) as “the
largest average catch that can be taken continuously from a stock under average
environmental conditions” (U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004, 34). The Act then
defines the concept of optimum yield (OY) as “the harvest level for a species that
achieves the greatest overall benefits, including economic, social, and biological
considerations” (U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004, 34). Optimum yield is a more
broadly based concept because it includes human economic and social considerations,
while maximum sustainable yield is limited to the biological impact of fishing. The
Magnuson-Stevens Act demands that maximum sustainable yield should be used to
determine the amount of fish that can be harvested sustainably, therefore limiting a large
portion of social and economic considerations from management.
The Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA) of 1996 introduced new concepts and
changes to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, including requiring Regional Fishery
Management Councils to address overfishing, reduce bycatch and waste, and protect fish
habitat (U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004; Dell’Apa et al, 2012). The 1996
amendments to Magnuson-Stevens also included the requirement for fishery management
plans to identify essential fish habitat for each fishery in order to promote conservation
and avoid excessive anthropogenic harm to these critical habitats. Because many fish
stocks remained threatened, Congress reauthorized and amended the MSA again in 2006,
calling for the use of science-based annual catch limits meant to end overfishing by 2011,
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and to rebuild populations based upon fishery dependent lifecycles. The 2006
reauthorization gave the Council the authority necessary to truly limit overfishing with
the introduction of annual catch limits. An annual catch limit is the amount of fish that
can be harvested from a stock per year; if this amount is exceeded, accountability
measures are instituted (GMFMC, 2014). Accountability measures are actions taken to
prevent the annual catch limit from being exceeded, or to correct/mitigate overages if
they occur (GMFMC, 2014). For example, if the quota is exceeded, the following year’s
quota might be reduced to account for the previous year’s quota overage. The 2006
reauthorization also suggested development of market-based fishery management through
limited access privilege programs, while encouraging greater international cooperation
(Dell’Apa et al., 2012). It was not until the 2006 reauthorization that regional councils
were forced to reduce overfishing and rebuild fish stocks on strict timelines. It appears
that Congress has become increasingly concerned about fisheries management over the
past several decades, demanding the use of progressively sophisticated concepts and
policy tools intended to ensure that marine resource users transition to more sustainable
uses.
Stock Health and Management
New and improved fishing technologies appeared after World War II, decreasing
the effort required per unit of fish landed, which led to a sharp decrease in the red snapper
stock (Porch, 2007; Shuler, 2015). Spawning potential ratio (SPR) is a biological
reference point used to measure the impact that fishing has on the ability of each young
fish (recruit) to contribute to spawning. Spawning potential is a ratio, between 0 and 1,
30

but usually some percent in between, derived by dividing the number of eggs that could
be produced by an average recruit in a fished stock by the number of eggs that could be
produced by an average recruit in an unfished stock (National Marine Fisheries Service,
2012). A spawning potential of 0% reflects a stock with no spawning, essentially a
collapsed stock; whereas a value of 100%, in a stock with no fishing pressure at all, is
typical of stocks producing plenty of new fish every year.
Because of overfishing, red snapper suffered a decrease in spawning potential
from nearly 45% in 1950 to 3% in 1990 (Shuler, 2015). Fish were being added to the
stock at a much lower rate than before because of significantly increased fishing pressure
from people (Figure 7). Red snapper are exceptionally vulnerable to overfishing because
females do not reach full sexual maturity until they reach five years of age, and 20-year
old fish produce millions more eggs per year than do 5-year olds. Overfishing is such a
serious problem for red snapper because if most of the older fish are taken out of the
stock, the remaining young fish produce far fewer offspring. Stock scientists also look for
age class variation within a population, similar to human population pyramids. An
appropriate age class structure would feature larger, young age classes and progressively
smaller, older age classes. Overfishing leads to a truncated age class because younger fish
are fished out before they reach old age, leading to less biomass in older age classes
(Saari et al, 2014) (Figure 8).
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Figure 7. Spawning Potential for Red Snapper in the GOM. The figure depicts
spawning potential based on historical landings data and projected spawning potential
after 2013. (NOAA Fisheries, n.d.B)

Figure 8. Age Class Variation Diagram for Red Snapper. This figure depicts an age
class structure of an overfished stock and a rebuilt stock. (NOAA Fisheries, n.d.B)
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A stock is considered overfished when the stock size remains below a prescribed
threshold, while overfishing is when the harvest rate is above a prescribed threshold
(Dell’Apa et al., 2012). A snapper species is considered overfished when the population
has an SPR of 20% or less of the unfished stock and is considered to be undergoing
overfishing when harvest rates exceed the population’s ability to maintain their
traditional SPR (South Atlantic Fishery Management Council, 1998). Responding to this
problem in 1984, the NMFS instituted a minimum size limit and bag limit to allow more
red snapper to reach sexual maturity and produce more eggs (Shuler, 2015). The
minimum size limit is a direct result of the fecundity of red snapper; larger fish produce
many more eggs than smaller ones (Curtis, 2014). After the NMFS’s Scientific and
Statistical Committee’s 1988 stock assessment, the NMFS declared this stock overfished
(Shuler, 2015). Both the NMFS and the GMFMC made rebuilding red snapper a top
priority in 1984, initially setting a recovery goal for 2000, which they eventually pushed
back to 2007, then to 2009, and now managers hope the stock is rebuilt by 2032 (Shuler,
2015). The 1990 stock assessment made it clear that 2007 was an unrealistic goal and
would not allow for any fishing in order to give red snapper a chance to recover. In 1992,
authorities pushed the rebuilding date back to 2009. In 2001, improved understanding of
red snapper life-cycle and science led them to extend rebuilding to 2032 (Shuler, 2015).
The 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act seeks to rebuild damaged fish stocks to a level that
supports MSY in 10 years or less (Cass-Calay et al., 2015). If stocks cannot be rebuilt in
10 years, the rebuilding time is based on a bio-mathematical model that predicts the
number of years it takes to rebuild a stock in the absence of fishing mortality plus one
generation (SEDAR, 2013). Since a red snapper generation is estimated to be nearly 20
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years, and at a fishing mortality of 26% of the population per year, it will take 12 years
plus 19.6 years generation time starting in 2000, resulting in a target recovery for 2032
(SEDAR, 2013). The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council used this science to
develop a plan to rebuild the red snapper stock, including dividing the fishery into
commercial and recreational sectors (Shuler, 2015).
In 1990, the GMFMC allocated 51% of the harvestable stock to commercial
fishermen, leaving 49% to recreational anglers; these figures were based on each sector’s
historical catch averages between 1979 to 1987 (Shuler, 2015). The recreational sector
was later divided into for-hire vessels and private vessels in 2014, while for-hire vessels
were even further split into charter boats and head boats (Figure 9). Head boats carry
large numbers of passengers for day trips and often drift fish over wrecks and reefs, while
charter boats carry a maximum of 6 people and often tailor fishing experiences to guests’
wishes. Charter and head boats fishing in federal waters are mandated to carry federal
permits for their fishing operations.
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Figure 9. Red Snapper Sector Separation. This figure depicts the division of the
commercial and recreational sectors and the further separation of the recreational sector.
Since the development of the initial Gulf of Mexico fishery management plan for
red snapper in 1984, the Gulf Council has passed over 40 amendments to this plan
(Appendix B). In 2015, the Gulf Council approved Amendment 40 for sector separation
quotas within the recreational sector, further subdividing the 49% quota to recreational
anglers by assigning 57.7% of the recreational quota to private individual anglers and the
remaining 42.3% of the recreational share to federally-permitted for-hire vessels (Hood,
2015). Effective May 2016, Amendment 28 adjusted red snapper annual catch limits to
48.5:51.5 for the commercial and recreational sectors, respectively (Department of
Commerce, 2016).
Both commercial and recreational sectors have experienced a significant
tightening of regulations in order to meet the 2032 goal of a healthy red snapper stock in
the Gulf of Mexico. The recreational sector has experienced bag limit reductions,
minimum-size restrictions, and shorter federal seasons, enforced by the NMFS, which are
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confounded by state noncompliance that allow state-water fishers to access the fishery
more often and to remove more fish than the prescribed federal rules allow (Shuler,
2015). Noncompliance with season regulations has become a trend with the Gulf States
over the last few years. Federal seasons are determined based on how quickly the Council
thinks each sector will catch their allotted pounds of fish, using previous landings
information. Because states choose season lengths in state waters, states have lengthened
their seasons over the last few years, resulting in a shortening of federal seasons, angering
most private recreational fishermen because more red snapper can be found in federal
waters than in state waters (Table 2). Lengthening state seasons causes a positive
feedback because it allows the annual catch limit to be filled quicker, resulting in fewer
pounds to be caught during the federal season. The 2016 federal season lasted 9 and 16
days for the private recreational and federal for-hire subsectors, respectively. Over the
past four years, state seasons have skyrocketed, with Texas starting the trend of
noncompliance (Figure 10).
Table 2. State Red Snapper Seasons from 2012-2016 in Days.
FL
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

AL
46*
65
52
70
78

MS
46
42
42
41
40

LA
46
42
36
118
207

*Bolded numbers are seasons compliant with federal regulation.
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TX
46
113
286
215
358

366
365
365
365
365

Figure 10. Recreational State and Federal Season Lengths. This graph depicts state
and federal red snapper season lengths for 2012-2016 in days per year.
The commercial sector is currently under an Individual Fishing Quota program to
eliminate the annual rush to catch as many fish as possible before the season ends
(otherwise known as derby fishing) (Shuler, 2015). Since implementation of the IFQ
program, commercial fishers harvest less than their allocation each year, and
overcapacity has fallen as some commercial operators have gone out of business and the
commercial season has been lengthened to year-round (Agar et al., 2014).
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Stock Assessments
Although Florida’s FWC manages red snapper in state waters, the NMFS
conducts stock assessments periodically throughout the Southeast using a Data,
Assessment, and Review process (NOAA Office of Science and Technology, n.d. A).
This process involves three steps: data workshop, stock assessment workshop, and peer
review (GOM Fishery Management Council, n.d.). The data workshop brings biologists,
data collectors, and experienced fishermen together to review available data, determine
what data should be used for, and to decide if further data and research is necessary. Then
they meet to decide the type of analysis that will be used to study the stock and how
much uncertainty is associated with such analysis. A stock assessment report is then
reviewed by a committee of independent fisheries analysts appointed by the Center of
Independent Experts. The Center was established by NOAA in 1998 to provide experts to
perform peer reviews of stock assessment reports to fulfill the peer review requirements
of National Standard 2. Experts are highly qualified individuals in the fields of fishery
stock assessment analysis and protected species and usually come from outside the U.S.
They produce a final report and an advisory report detailing strengths, weaknesses, and
further suggestions for future stock assessments. Using this final report, regulators are
able to make informed decisions regarding the health and management of the fish stock.
Stock assessments include four main sections: an introduction, data review and
update, stock assessment methods, and model results. The introduction describes the
stock’s management history by outlining fishery management plan amendments and
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reviewing previous assessments’ results. The data review and update details the life
history of the stock, including genetics, habitat requirements, growth, reproduction, age,
and natural mortality. Assessments include stock landings, discards and bycatch, and
biological sampling data, which are placed into statistical models. The methods section
explains model configurations and equations, parameters, uncertainty measures, and
sensitivity analysis. Model results update decision makers on the stock’s status and
progress towards rebuilding the stock, and determine how well the management system is
performing.
Data used for stock assessments is either fishery independent or dependent data
(Cooper, 2006). Fishery dependent data is collected from the fishing process, through
self-reporting, dockside and telephone interviews/surveys, and onboard observers.
Fishery independent data is obtained through trawls, acoustic, video and side-scan sonar
surveys, and tagging methods. All of this data provides scientists with information on
catch, relative abundance, and life history of fish species. Stock analysts take data
collected from a range of sources and plug them into population dynamics models (which
are subject to frequent calibration and re-calibration) to develop an estimate of how many
fish will be in a stock the following year. The following equation is a simple example of a
population dynamics model used by fisheries scientists: N2 = N1 - D1 + R1 where
N1 = is the number of fish alive this year
D1 = is the number of fish dying this year
R1 = is the number of fish born this year
N2 = is the number of fish alive next year
Biologists use the reproductive rate, or fecundity, of specific species to estimate the
number of fish born and added to the stock each year. Instantaneous mortality rate is the
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rate at which the stock is shrinking, accounting for natural and fishing mortality. This is
why it is important to have accurate data on fish catch because this can be a big portion of
fish mortality. Advanced statistical analysis is performed to determine the relative health
of the stock, which guides decision-making.
Recreational fishing data is collected through surveys, including the Marine
Recreational Information Program, established by NOAA Fisheries in 1979 to monitor
saltwater recreational fisheries (Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission3,
n.d). In Florida, FWC biologists conduct multiple MRIP surveys (both in-person and
telephone) with recreational anglers to estimate the number of fish caught, kept, and
discarded (NOAA Office of Science and Technology, n.d. A). Recreational anglers claim
that the federal government relies upon inaccurate and outdated recreational landings
data, however states collect the data that is incorporated into stock assessments (Masson,
2015). At the same time, commercial fishing data is primarily collected by the federal
government through the Gulf Fisheries Information Network and Trip Interview
Programs, using state-mandated fishery trip-tickets, landing weigh out reports provided
by seafood dealers, federal logbooks of fishery catch and effort, and shipboard and
portside interviews and biological sampling of catches (NOAA Office of Science and
Technology, n.d. B). It is widely believed that commercial landings data is far more
accurate than recreational landings data, which is collected on a voluntary basis
(Tomalin, 2016).
There is agreement between recreational and commercial fishermen that better
data is needed to properly manage red snapper and other species (Tomalin, 2016). In
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2016, President Barrack Obama approved Congress’s Fiscal Year 2016 Appropriations
Act, introduced by Senator Richard Shelby (R-Al) and Congressman David Jolly (R-Fl),
granting $5-million to NOAA’s National Sea Grant program to conduct external research
on a red snapper tagging study throughout the Gulf of Mexico (Lallo, 2015B). Congress
allocated another $5-million to develop a fishing data collection program using a third
party managed by the National Marine Fisheries Service Southeast Regional Office in St.
Petersburg, Florida (Tomalin, 2016). A total of $10 million will be put towards
developing improved data collection and analysis efforts for fish populations in the
GOM, including red snapper, in the coming years (Tomalin, 2016).
Meanwhile, the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Consortium, on behalf of the
university Sea Grant programs in the Gulf of Mexico region and NOAA Fisheries
Service, recently accepted proposals to design an experimental fishing data collection
system that will assess the Gulf-wide population of red snapper (Rohring, 2016).
Proposals must include data collection systems that produce a Gulf-wide estimate of red
snapper two years old and older and an estimate of biological parameters, such as natural
mortality and growth rates. The successful design proposal will be used in future red
snapper stock analyses. If more accurate and widely accepted data shows an improved
stock, the NMFS will be able to increase red snapper annual catch limits for both
commercial and recreational sectors, satisfying both interests (Tomalin, 2016).
Although the stock is managed Gulf-wide, stock assessments are conducted based
on the notion that there are two dominant sub-stocks, one east and one west of the
Mississippi River (Cass-Calay et al., 2015). The two populations are managed as one,
however stock analysts believe the two sub-stocks are rebuilding at different paces,
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possibly due to varying angler pressure in the two regions. Recruitment has increased in
the West since the 1980s, while recruitment in the East peaked in the mid-2000s and has
decreased slightly since then (Cass-Calay et al., 2015). However, the most recent stock
assessment suggests total and spawning stock biomass have been increasing since 1990,
consistent across both regions. According to the 2014 Southeast Data, Assessment, and
Review Process (SEDAR) red snapper stock assessment, 31 Update, the stock biomass
for the Gulf of Mexico is increasing, yet it remains below the minimum stock size
threshold, which indicates that it is still considered overfished (Figure 5) (Cass-Calay et
al., 2015).
Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act
In July 2015, the five Gulf States of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas—working through Congressman Garrett Graves (R-La)—proposed H.R. 3094
The Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act to request the transfer of federal
management of red snapper to the states (U.S. House of Representatives, n.d.). Each Gulf
State would be responsible for red snapper in waters up to 200 nautical miles offshore,
and fisheries management would be independently enforced by each state. The
overseeing authority, the Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority (GSRSMA),
would be comprised of the fisheries management directors of the five Gulf States whose
chair would rotate every two years (U.S. House of Representatives, n.d.).
The authority would create an overarching red snapper fishery management plan
from which the states could develop state-specific fishery management regulations, such
as season lengths. The proposal also claims it will conduct annual stock assessments and
assess the gulf-wide stock status no less than every five years. Quotas would be
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determined based on stock assessments, however there is no mention of accountability
measures that would keep fishermen within their quotas. In the event of overfishing, the
state shall submit a report to the authority that the state has implemented measures to end
overfishing or rebuild the fishery. The authority can also vote on whether they believe it
is necessary to notify the Secretary of Commerce for a fishery closure. Public
participation includes having at least one public hearing in each Gulf state and allowing
written comments to be submitted to the GSRSMA. It is unclear how they will
incorporate public comment or if it will comply with the National Environmental Policy
Act.
Gulf States claim they would “use flexible management approaches to manage
red snapper to meet local needs as well as Gulf-wide conservation goals,” (Reichers et
al., 2015, 1). Because federal fisheries management has become more restrictive over
time, some observers are concerned that state management will become less restrictive
and insufficient to protect the species. Reactions to this legislation have been mixed, with
concerns from both commercial and recreational anglers, but the Gulf States are receiving
crucial support from recreational fishing advocacy groups, including the American
Sportfishing Association, Center for Coastal Conservation, and Coastal Conservation
Association (Masson, 2015). The American Sportfishing Association (ASA, n.d.A) is the
sportfishing industry’s trade association, advocating for recreational anglers, and related
businesses, agencies, and organizations. Gulf coast recreational anglers launched the
Coastal Conservation Association (CCA, n.d.) to address what they claim is commercial
overfishing: “Through broad-based recreational angler support; a strong legal and
legislative presence; decades of experience; and an unwavering vision for the future of
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U.S. and global marine resources, CCA battles for the sustainable health of our coastal
fisheries and for recreational anglers’ interests.” The Center for Coastal Conservation
(CCC) (n.d.) is a political action committee that aims to persuade decision makers
regarding marine-resource policy initiatives and to affect the political process to
maximize opportunity for saltwater recreational anglers while limiting or eliminating
commercial fishing. According to several knowledgeable fisheries stakeholders I spoke
with, these groups have mobilized to put pressure on state representatives to introduce a
bill that could possibly eliminate commercial fishing. Representative Graves claims, in a
November 2015 congressional hearing, that he repeatedly reached out to get input from
the commercial fishing industry, but received none (Lallo, 2015A). However the bill’s
inclusion of a provision that would allow the GSRSMA to reduce the commercial fishing
quota by 10% each year without review has sparked public outrage within the
commercial fishing community (GOM Reef Fish Shareholders Alliance, 2016).
Knowledge Gap
Although the Gulf States are confident in their ability to take over red snapper
management, it is not clear that they would do a better job than the NMFS, and the root
sources of the state proposal are unclear as well. Through further research, this thesis will
contribute to the analysis of state/federal natural resources management by examining the
perspectives of many different sets of stakeholders involved in Gulf red snapper
management. Stakeholder groups include dual-permitted fishermen, commercial
fishermen, commercial fishing organizations, recreational fishing organizations, as well
as representatives of NMFS and state marine resources agencies. In addition, it is
important to clarify the current responsibilities of Florida and U.S. fisheries management
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agencies in the Gulf of Mexico. The overall objective is to investigate what is driving
Gulf States to push for state management of red snapper, despite the fact that federal
management has helped red snapper begin to recover. Using stock assessments,
congressional documents, and interviews, this study will determine the merit of a possible
transfer of fisheries management authority to states and provide suggestions for the future
direction of red snapper management.
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Chapter Three: Methods
This study creates a timeline that compares the history of the Gulf’s red snapper
stock with the many amendments and changes to the Gulf Council’s fishery management
plans. Analysis of literature identifies the history of Gulf red snapper management by
Florida and federal agencies. To study the effectiveness of management over time, this
thesis analyzes stock assessments and other government reports, and academic journal
articles. The primary data for this study consists of semi-structured interviews with
various stakeholders to reveal what they think of historic and current management of red
snapper; why they think there is a movement to put states solely in charge of red snapper
management; and do they think such a movement has merit.
Interviews were conducted with scientists at state and federal fishery management
agencies, State fish and wildlife commission employees, personnel affiliated with
recreational fishing organizations and commercial fishing organizations, dual-permitted
anglers, seafood dealers, and non-profit environmental advocacy organizations (Table 3).
Because of the controversy surrounding red snapper, participants will be referred to by
generic names that identify which stakeholder group they represent to protect their
identities (Table 3). Participants hailed from all five Gulf States, with the largest sample
size from Florida and Texas, represented with 8 and 4 participants, respectively (Table 4).
In addition to learning about each stakeholder’s perspective on who they think is pushing
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for a state takeover and why, participants were probed to learn of their opinions on
current data collection and stock assessment systems.
Table 3. Stakeholder Groups and Descriptions.
Stakeholder Group

Sample

Size

Commercial Fishermen
Charter For-Hire Fishermen

1
1

Dual-Permitted Fishermen
Commercial Fishing
Organization Representative
Recreational Fishing
Organization Representative
Seafood Dealer
Environmental Non-Profit
Organization Representative

2

Federal Agency Employee

2

State Agency Employee
Total

1
1
1
3

3
15

Table 4. State Participation.
State Sample Size
FL
8
AL
1
MS
1
LA
1
TX
4
Total
15
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Definition
Captain that participates in IFQ
commercial fishery
Captain that holds a federal for-hire permit
Captain that holds both a commercial
license and federal for-hire permit
Organization that advocates on behalf of
commercial fishermen
Organization that advocates on behalf of
recreational fishermen
Owner of seafood company
Works at environmental advocacy
organization
Works at federal fisheries management
agency
Works at Gulf State fisheries management
agency

To study stakeholders’ perceptions of the current and future management of red
snapper, a series of open-ended questions were developed. Questions were approved by
the University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to being sent to
participants (see Appendix). Potential participants (35) were sent emails requesting their
participation in the study. Once contact was made and research subjects agreed to
participate, they were sent the interview questions and the IRB informed consent
paperwork, outlining their rights as a research participant (see Appendix). Participants
were asked eight questions regarding current management of red snapper, state interests,
and fishery management/monitoring mechanisms.
Semi-structured interviews gauge how the social dynamics of the fishery
influence fishery management plan changes and stock rebuilding progress. A total of 155
participants were interviewed, five in-person and ten by telephone, resulting in a response
rate of 43%. All interviews took place between August 2016 and December 2016. In
addition to the 15 participants, I spoke with Congressman David Jolly (R-Fl) about red
snapper data collection, stakeholders’ concerns, and his opinion of the state management
proposal in an informal interview. Specific stakeholders were selected because of their
positions within the agencies and organizations they work for and their knowledge and
involvement in the red snapper fishery. Although the sample size is not fully
representative of both recreational and commercial sectors, the participants were chosen
based on their expertise and are highly regarded in their respective fields.

5

Congressman Jolly is not included in the 15 participants because our conservation did
not involve the interview questions. This conversation was not recorded as requested by
the Congressman and his staff, therefore, anecdotes are paraphrased.
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Interviews were audio recorded with the signed permission of each interviewee.
Audio recordings were transcribed and coded for major themes using thematic analysis.
As one might imagine, answers varied widely amongst interviewees. Participants’
answers were analyzed by question and then separated into a smaller number of general
categories and by stakeholder (King and Horrocks, 2010). Once answers were divided,
reoccurring themes were developed based on grouped answers and subject matter.
Answers, number of participants and stakeholder groups for each answer were placed
into tables (Table 5). For example, participants were asked how stock assessments could
be improved. Answers to this question included obtaining more timely data, better fishery
independent data and better recreational fishing data. Participant answer percentages will
not necessarily add up to 15 or 100% because participants may have given more than one
answer. A table was not created for each question, however several of these tables appear
throughout the results section.
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Table 5. Example of Participant Answer Codes to the Following Question: How can
red snapper stock assessments be improved?
Code

Answer

Number of
Participants
6/15

4a.1.1

Obtain data in a
more timely fashion.

4a.1.2

Acquire better
fishery independent
data.

5/15

4a.1.3

Acquire better data
on recreational
fishing.

7/15
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Stakeholder
Groups
State Agency
Employee,
Environmental NonProfit Organization
Representative,
Charter/Commercial
Fishermen,
Commercial Fishing
Organization,
Seafood Dealer
Environmental NonProfit Organization
Representative,
Charter Fisherman,
Federal Agency
Employee,
Recreational
Fishing
Organization, State
Agency Employee
Commercial/Charter
Fisherman,
Commercial
Fisherman, Seafood
Dealer, Commercial
Fishing
Organization,
Federal Agency
Employee,
Environmental NonProfit Organization
Representative

Chapter 4: Results
The subject of red snapper fish has raised many contentious issues between state
and federal management agencies, as well as between commercial, private recreational,
and for-hire fishermen, because of overfishing, quota overages and allocation decisions.
Although the red snapper stock appears to be recovering from near collapse, tensions
between stakeholders concerning access, data accuracy, and accountability have caused
an unwillingness to collaborate on political decisions within the fishery (Cass-Calay et
al., 2015). As a result, a proposal to completely transfer management of the species from
the federal government to the five Gulf States appeared in July 2015. To better
understand what sparked this proposal, stakeholders were asked questions about the
effectiveness of the current fishery management plan, perceived benefits/challenges of a
state takeover, stock assessments, and the future direction of the fishery.
Magnuson-Stevens Act Performance
Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act in 1976 to more effectively manage the nation’s marine waters beyond state control,
to rid the exclusive economic zone of foreign fishing vessels and to enhance national
security (Dell’Apa, 2012). The MSA includes accountability measures, actions taken to
prevent annual catch limits from being exceeded, or to correct/mitigate overages if they
occur (GMFMC, 2014). Under the 2006 reauthorization, federal fisheries managers were
instructed to craft and implement plans to end overfishing of threatened species.
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To establish stakeholders’ perceptions of management effectiveness, the first
question of each interview asked how well they think the Red Snapper Fishery
Management Plan (FMP) abides by/executes the national standards set forth by the MSA.
All 15 participants agreed that the Red Snapper FMP abides by the national standards
“very well.” Some applauded National Standard 1, which calls for an end to overfishing,
while others were more critical. Private recreational fishermen are critical of National
Standard 1 because in order for stocks to be rebuilt according to schedule, total allowable
catch must be constrained, limiting anglers’ access to fish.
Individual Fishing Quotas for commercial harvest of red snapper first appeared in
2007, and these are intended to reduce overfishing. Harvesting levels are supposed to be a
function of each sector’s respective quota, set by the Council. In 2016, the commercial
sector’s quota for red snapper was 48.5% of total allowable catch, approximately 6.768
million pounds, while the recreational sector could harvest the remaining 51.5% of the
total allowable catch (7.076 million pounds); and these recreational pounds are further
divided between private recreational fishers (57.7%) and federal for-hire anglers (43.3%)
(GOM Fishery Management Council, 2016). Commercial fishermen abide by the IFQ
program, and they—along with other stakeholders—called out the recreational sector for
routinely exceeding their sector’s quotas with relative impunity, until recently with the
introduction of accountability measures. One commercial captain exclaimed, “We’re
really sick and tired of every year when the numbers come out, recreational fishermen
have gone over their quota again, or management has let them go over the quota again
and again and again.” One fisheries manager at the NMFS contends that it is challenging
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to rebuild the stock to support maximum long-term yield when the users, particularly
recreational fishermen, are less concerned with sustainable yield, and “more worried
about, for instance, having a longer fishing season.” Recreational fishermen believe a
longer season will provide more access to fish, however increasing the length of the
season will not afford them more opportunity to fish, unless the quota is also increased.
One federal fisheries manager claims that the plan embraces the 10 standards in
the MSA, including developing a stock rebuilding plan, using best available science, and
taking socio-economic information into account when making decisions. He also
mentioned that in 2010, the Council switched from a constant catch scenario to a constant
F plan. A constant catch scenario is when an annual quota is set for the year, however red
snapper were overfished because stock decline (mortality) was not taken into account
when determining this quota (Tong et al., 2013). A constant fishing mortality plan
(constant F) takes into account standard fisheries benchmarks, such as natural mortality
and spawning potential, and mortality at maximum sustainable yield should not exceed
spawning biomass (Powers, 1996). The red snapper plan coordinator explains it as such,
Rather than taking out so many fish, we’re taking out a proportion of the fish in
the population. The advantage of doing that is that as population rebuilds, the
catch can increase, whereas if you have a constant catch scenario, since you’re
holding catch constant over time, what happens is when you get closer to having
the stock rebuilt people see a lot of fish out there and you need to keep the catch
artificially small. This way, as the stock rebuilds, our quotas can go up.
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Using this type of rebuilding scenario allows the acceptable biological catch to increase
as the stock increases, which has resulted in quota increases every few years since 2010,
contrary to what recreational fishermen argue (GMFMC, 2014).
Perceived Benefits and Challenges of a Stake Takeover of Red Snapper
Management
While the Gulf States’ proposal to manage red snapper from each state’s coast out
to 200 miles offshore claims it will benefit everyone, some stakeholders believe
otherwise. After speaking with representatives of the major groups involved, 6/15
participants are convinced the proposed legislation is only aimed at advancing the private
recreational sector (Marine Fish Conservation Network, 2016; Cantrell et al., 2015;
Crockett, 2016). The proposal allows for up to a 10% reduction in commercial quota per
year without review or approval by the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council,
allowing for the decrease of commercial access and possible elimination of the
commercial sector in the future. One dual-permitted captain remarked, “I see absolutely
no benefits other than if your goal is to hijack the resource from the consumer and the
commercial fisheries and stop or prevent any further improvement in management of the
charter for-hire sector. If those are your goals then H.R. 3094 will be beneficial for that.
But to the American consumer, the non-boat owning public, H.R. 3094 will be the death
knell to the industry and to the consumer’s access to wild caught/grown seafood.”
When asked what the benefits of a state takeover might be, many participants
could only muster one: local knowledge might better inform local management. Some
state employees were adamant that local knowledge would allow states to tailor
management and assessments to state specific geography and cultures. Stakeholders
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supporting the proposed state takeover claim that state management would provide
flexibility, for example, in choosing the length and timing of each state’s recreational
fishing season in both state and federal waters. Supporters also mentioned the ability for
states to define the universe of anglers and stakeholders working directly with the state as
benefits, however they did not explain how this would improve management.
Because remaining commercial fishermen are satisfied with the IFQ system and
their allocation, they are worried that a shake-up in the red snapper fishery could result in
detrimental effects to the resource and their businesses. Commercial and charter for-hire
fishermen said they would support a state takeover only if the commercial and charter
for-hire sectors’ quotas were not lowered as a result. Yet one environmental advocacy
organization representative opined that: “I would say that benefits would probably flow
mostly to the private recreational component of the fishery, and the charter for hire and
commercial components for the fishery would suffer.”
The state proposal claims it will use “flexible management approaches,” a term
that agitates many stakeholders, because it is reminiscent of the management style (no
quotas or accountability) prior to the late 1980s that nearly resulted in a fishery collapse.
One commercial fishing organization director asked, “What does flexibility mean?
Because historically. . . in a number of situations flexibility has meant exceeding building
timelines, extending their building timelines, exceeding their quotas and sidestepping
conservation.” One seafood dealer expressed similar skepticism with the concept of
flexibility: “The problem is the theory applicable or flexible which is what everybody
keeps talking about on this issue, specifically in this state (FL), it’s what got us to where
we were with red snapper in the 90s and now.” Participants’ concern over flexibility
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stems from lenient management prior to development of the stock rebuilding plan in the
late 1980s, before the existence of total allowable catch limits and accountability
measures.
Some state agency employees insist that with more accurate data, stock
management could be more flexible. For example, they could reduce or eliminate what
managers call a “buffer” on the annual recreational quota. A buffer is an accountability
measure that results in a portion, 20% in this case, of the annual catch limit being set
aside to account for management uncertainty and quota overages. In 2014, as a result of
being sued by a commercial fisherman for allowing recreational fishers to routinely
exceed their quotas, the Gulf Council established a 20% buffer on the recreational annual
catch target (GMFMC, 2014). For instance, in 2014, the recreational fishers’ initial share
of the total allowable catch was determined to be 5.39 mp, but Gulf Council then
trimmed this allocation by 20% (the buffer) so that the final quota for recreational anglers
was only 4.31 mp (20% less than 5.39 mp). In 2014, Buddy Guindon, a prominent
commercial captain, filed a suit on behalf of commercial fishermen against the Council
for violating the MSA by allowing a fall season for recreational fishers when the
recreational quota had already been met (GMFMC, 2014). A federal judge ultimately
found the NMFS violated the MSA by not closing the recreational fishing season in
federal waters after this sector overfished its quota. As a result of this lawsuit, a 20%
buffer was instituted as an accountability measure and the 2014 season length was
determined based on the annual catch target, which is 20% less than the recreational
quota (GMFMC, 2014).
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The Coastal Conservation Association (CCA) filed an unsuccessful lawsuit
against the Council in 2015, citing sector separation (setting separate quotas for private
recreational and for-hire fishers) as an “agency action that is arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law and in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations” (Dute, 2015). Private recreational fishermen opposed sector
separation because it secured a portion of their quota for the for-hire subsector, resulting
in a reduced quota for private recreational fishers. One CCA spokesperson claimed
“Amendment 40 embodies everything that is wrong with federal management of our
marine resources. It is completely out of step with this nation's heritage of wildlife
resource management” (Dute, 2015). The opposition to sector separation is an additional
example of the fundamental difference between fish and wildlife resource management
ideologies. Sector separation divided the recreational sector’s quota and season days
between private recreational anglers and for-hire (charter and headboat) fishermen. In
2016, private recreational fishermen had a 9-day season in federal waters, while for-hire
fishermen had a 16-day season. Many stakeholders fear a state takeover would result in
disagreements about regulations and seasons; they are unconvinced that cooperation
between states would lead to an equitable division of the resource, as seen with the
Council’s proposed Amendment 39. Amendment 39 would have instituted regionally
specific management measures under the Council’s authority, however the states could
not agree upon initial state allocations so the Council tabled the amendment (Rainer,
2016).
In addition to concern over flexible provisions, one charter fisherman was
unimpressed with the proposal’s vague language: “And that was the unfortunate part of
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the legislation. Is that it was long on promises and very, very short on specifics about
how each state would ensure that their state fishermen would not overfish their allocation.
There is nothing in the language of HR-3094 that gives anyone a warm and fuzzy feeling
that overfishing in each state’s sector will not occur.” The proposed Act claims “each
Gulf state would formally agree to comply fully with management measures developed
through the Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority-approved Plan under a
memorandum of agreement,” without ever explaining what the agreement would look
like (Reichers et al., 2015, 4). State representatives refused to spell out what a state
takeover would entail. Biologists and fisheries scientists believe it is “biologically
nonsensical” to manage a stock with different management regulations from different
states, while proponents of the state-controlled fishery assured that there would only be
one management authority, the Gulf State Red Snapper Management Authority
(GSRSMA).
According to the proposal document, the governing authority would be comprised
of the lead fisheries managers from the five Gulf States’ fish and wildlife commissions,
with a rotating chair every two years (Reichers et al., 2015). Creating different
management regulations with oversight from an elected chair violates the principles of
current U.S. fisheries management as outlined in the MSA’s transparency clauses and in
touchstone environmental protection legislation like the National Environmental Policy
Act. For example, according to National Standard 3 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, any
stock of fish should be managed as a unit throughout its range. Even more concerning is
the Gulf States’ commitment to abandoning the federal system. The proposal is adamant
about renouncing any ties to the current fishery management scheme. The proposal
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contends that: “[H.R. 3094] and any provisions of [H.R. 3094] regarding management
and enforcement of any regulations and management provisions to the extent that there is
any conflict will take precedence over the MSA and any portions of the Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Management Council’s Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan.”
When asked how states would ensure that an increase in access would not result
in a return to overfishing, most participants expressed serious doubts (Table 6). One
commercial fishing organization director put it this way: “So long story short, I don’t
have any faith that the Gulf States can implement an accountable system that . . . prevents
overfishing, because nearly everything they’ve done to date has shown that they don’t
want to do that.” A scientist expressed similar concern, contending that “From the
rhetoric I’ve heard they think the stock’s already rebuilt so that means that they wouldn’t
strive to rebuild the stocks further. My biggest worry is that the states will kind of
succumb to the tragedy of the commons6.” Finally, according to this charter boat captain,
“States are more concerned with user access than they are with the biology and the
sustainability of the resource. And they always err on the side of access. They don’t take
more restrictive measures because it’s politically unsavory at the commission and at the
governor’s level.”

6

Garrett Hardin’s 1968 article on the “Tragedy of the Commons” outlines an open access
situation in which members of a group exercise self-interest (taking more for themselves)
rather than interest in the common good (restraint), resulting in overexploitation of the
resource.
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Table 6. Likelihood of States to Control Overfishing with Increased Access.
Question
It has been
reported many
times that the
states' main
interest is
improving access
to the red
snapper stock;
how do you think
the states, if put
in charge, will
ensure that
increased access
will not result in
increased
overfishing?

Answers

Number of Stakeholders Stakeholder Groups

More likely
for states to
prevent
overfishing

3/15 (20%)

Less likely
for states to
prevent
overfishing

11/15 (73%)

State Agency Employees,
Recreational Fishing
Organization
Representative
Commercial Fishing
Organization, Charter
Fisherman, Seafood
Dealer, State Agency
Employee, Federal
Agency Employee,
Environmental Non-Profit
Organization
Representative,
Commercial Fishing
Organization

Red Snapper Stock Assessments
The underlying tension surrounding the red snapper fishery partially stems from
the notion that recreational red snapper harvest data is inaccurate. Data is the driving
factor that decides allocation, season length, the health of the stock, and so forth,
therefore data accuracy is the fishery’s most important issue. Recreational data is
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collected voluntarily through dockside interviews and telephone surveys, while
commercial fishermen are federally mandated to report landings using electronic
logbooks. Scientists rely upon this data to assess the relative condition of red snapper
stocks in the Gulf of Mexico.
To date, recreational surveys collect data regarding angler target species, lengths
and weights of harvested fish, annual and recent angler fishing effort, and number of fish
harvested and released. When asked how current stock assessments could be improved,
7/15 participants mentioned obtaining more accurate data on recreational fish catch. No
participants mentioned or questioned the accuracy of commercial data. NOAA scientists
admitted to weaknesses in the data collection process, including the need for more
intensive sampling and the relative inefficiency of recreational catch surveys. Concern
about the accuracy of recreational data emanates from the fact that researchers currently
focus on effort (amount of fishing pressure) rather than developing an estimate of how
many fish are landed and discarded. With a more accurate estimation of how many fish
are landed, scientists can better approximate the size and health of the stock. Because of
the large number of anglers in the Gulf of Mexico, biologists cannot reach every angler,
resulting in a partially representative sample of fishing activity.
Because of their dissatisfaction with the current data collection system, each state
has recently created their own red snapper data collection methods. Although Florida,
Alabama, and Mississippi use the MRIP system to report data, Texas and Louisiana use
their own data collection methods to contribute data to federal stock assessments.
Combining various data collection methods, without proper validation by the NMFS,
only further complicates stock analysis. If fishery managers could agree on a standard set
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of principles, perhaps each state could tailor data collection systems to their anglers,
whether through an electronic app or a telephone survey, while also providing certified
data for federal stock assessments. However, by replacing the federal system with several
different state data collection methods7 and not contributing to the overall federal data
repository used to conduct stock assessments, states are exercising a form of rebellion,
likely out of frustration. Statements from several of the states’ marine resource agency
websites reveal their dissatisfaction with current recreational red snapper data collection.
For example, one Florida official acknowledged that “The current process for conducting
recreational fisheries surveys, known as the Marine Recreational Information Program
(MRIP), is broad and doesn’t capture the amount and quality of data needed for effective
management of reef fish species.” Indeed, a Louisiana scientist boasts that
Thanks to the support of Louisiana anglers, Louisiana Department of Wildlife
and Fisheries Biologists measured 23 times more fish and surveyed 49 times more
vessel trips than the federal MRIP Survey. This meant that we were able to
provide more precise estimates of the numbers and sizes of red snapper harvested
during that season.
Finally, the Alabama fisheries official notes that
The credibility of the current federal surveys used to estimate recreational red
snapper harvests among private and charter anglers has been under ever
increasing scrutiny… However, recent changes to the federal law that governs
how red snapper are managed have led to the imposition of stricter regulations

7

Florida: Gulf Reef Fish Survey; Alabama: Snapper Check; Mississippi: Tails n’ Scales;
Louisiana: The Louisiana Recreational Creel Survey (LA Creel); Texas: Snapper Survey.
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each year with slim hopes for improvement. A timely and accurate method of
counting fish such as the mandatory reporting program could improve the
predicament we face in this fishery.
Although states are creating recreational surveys, there needs to be an open flow of
verified data for analysis to be as accurate possible.
One third of participants mentioned improving fishery independent data, which
the supervisor of stock assessments for the Gulf region assured me is already being
discussed at the NMFS. Fishery independent data is usually collected by federal and state
governments and involves standardized sampling, often using trawls, seines,
hydroacoustics and video, to determine species abundance, size-age relationships, and
possible changes in range distribution (Cooper, 2006). A portion of the $10 million that
Congressman David Jolly (R-Fl) secured for NOAA will likely go towards improving the
fishery independent data collection program to better analyze stock size and health using
more robust sampling methods. In addition to better independent data, more fishery
dependent data is needed from the recreational sector, likely in the form of more
intensive dockside surveys throughout the day and over a wider range of locations.
Stakeholders also called for more frequent red snapper stock assessments, however,
investing in additional red snapper data collection and analysis costs additional money
that agencies rarely have because they have many other species to monitor. As seen in
Table 7, formal red snapper stock assessments began in 1987 and now average about
once every four years, similar to assessments of other species.
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Table 7. NMFS Red Snapper Stock Assessment Years. This table shows the years a
stock assessment for red snapper was produced. Earlier years averaged a 1-1.5 years
apart, while more recent assessments average ~4 years apart.
1987
1995

1988
1997

1990
1988

2009

2013

1993
1999
2014update

1994
2005

When stakeholders were asked what improvements could be made to stock
assessment analysis to better guide decision-making, 6/15 mentioned advancing the
timeliness of data collection and analysis (Table 8). Because stock assessments take so
long to produce, when they are finally published, they describe data from prior years and
paint a picture of what the stock may have looked like a year or two before.
Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to conduct a full assessment of the current state of
the stock at any given time. During a conversation with Congressman David Jolly, he
revealed that fishermen expressed confusion about what a recovered fishery entails and
that they will never understand what it means to be sustainable if they do not first grasp
this concept. After speaking with many stakeholders, it is evident that fisheries scientists
need to do a better job of explaining the stock assessment process to fishermen and the
general public. It is difficult for fishermen and stakeholders to make informed judgments
if they do not understand stock assessment analysis.
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Table 8. Participant Answers to How Stock Assessments Can Be Improved.
Question
What
improvements
should be made
to stock
assessment
analysis to
ensure
allocations are
based on the
most up to date
stock
information?

Answers

Number of Stakeholders Stakeholder Groups

More timely
data

6/15 (40%)

Better
fishery
independent
data

5/15 (33%)

Better
recreational
data

7/15 (47%)

State Agency Employee,
Environmental NonProfit Organization
Representative,
Charter/Commercial
Fishermen, Commercial
Fishing Organization,
Seafood Dealer
Environmental NonProfit Organization
Representative, Charter
Fisherman, Federal
Agency Employee,
Recreational Fishing
Organization, State
Agency Employee
Commercial/Charter
Fisherman, Commercial
Fisherman, Seafood
Dealer, Commercial
Fishing Organization,
Federal Agency
Employee,
Environmental NonProfit Organization
Representative

Future Direction of the Red Snapper Fishery
Although user groups’ social goals vary, all involved in the fishery want a healthy
stock; however, interest groups differ on what they think is the most effective path to
achieving this goal. The Gulf Council’s red snapper recovery plan sets a target recovery
for 2032, with a spawning potential ratio of 26% to support a reasonably high level of
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fishing pressure on the stock. The 26% SPR means the population needs to increase to a
level where it is producing roughly one quarter of the eggs that would be produced by an
unfished population.
Participants were asked their opinions on how to achieve red snapper recovery.
Many stakeholders believe that holding the private recreational sector accountable would
solve quota overage issues, therefore allowing the stock to rebound. To achieve this
accountability, 7/15 participants, including NOAA Scientists, NGO Environmental
Organizations, a Charter/Commercial Fisherman, Commercial Fisherman, and Seafood
Dealer, recommended a tag system, in which recreational fishermen obtain tags from
state commissions, available contingent on each year’s allocation. Tags may be
distributed a number of ways, including a lottery where fishermen can be awarded a
certain number of tags; each tag allows the owner to catch and keep a red snapper. Tag
systems are usually enforced in fisheries that need harvest control and improved
management. Potential benefits of a tag system include the ability to enforce harvesting
limits, providing more reliable catch data, and the potential for longer seasons (Johnston,
2008).
Recreational fishermen and state commissions, however, oppose tag systems
because they create a market and competition within the fishery, a principle these groups
strongly advocate against. One recreational fishing organization representative put it this
way:
I don’t like the trend at the Council level of moving this fish more and more
towards privatization, or IFQs. I think these fish belong to the public. I think the
market ought to drive who goes out there and fish for them. I think access should
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be fair. I don’t think the government should be deciding who and who does not
get to fish.
Yet one environmental advocacy organization representative disagrees, contending that
There’s been a lot of opposition to these things [individual fishing rights], under
the guise of saying that it’s privatizing the fishery, but I don’t see a lot of
difference with what we’re doing now except tags actually provide some of the
data we’re looking for and provide some more access, more flexible access of
what we’re looking for.
Federal authorities have promoted catch share programs for fish species in the past, but
this ultimately limits the number of participants in the fishery; meanwhile, states and
recreational fishermen are pushing for transfer of management to states because they
think mostly in terms of expanding access. Although tag programs offer many potential
benefits, they certainly complicate the social dynamics of fisheries. If a tag system were
implemented, ~5.3 million pounds of fish would have to be split between roughly 3.1
million Gulf state recreational anglers, effectively eliminating access for many fishermen
(Ocean Conservancy, n.d.). As human populations in Gulf States continue to climb, there
will likely be more than 3.1 million Gulf State recreational fishers in the near future.
Other suggestions for promoting a sustainable fishery included creating different
fishery management plans for each subsector, while sticking to the general contours of
the current rebuilding plan and regional management system, perhaps while collecting
better data (Table 9). Because each component of the fishery has unique needs and
varying fishing cultures, different management plans for each sector would allow the
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Council to manage the subsector in a system, whether IFQ, tags, or otherwise, that
accounts for these socio-political variables, while keeping fishermen within their quotas.
For a majority of study participants, their largest concern is accountability,
because without it, they believe the fishery will not recover. Some state representatives
and one recreational fishing organization person indicated that they believe the stock is
already or nearly recovered. Because of this unsubstantiated belief, a state scientist is
convinced that “now you have the ability to be more flexible with management and that
is very doable without compromising the rebuilding process.” Others believe the
rebuilding plan is working and that it is best to stay on course until the stock is fully
recovered. Some stakeholders think better data, from all fishery components—especially
from private recreational fishers—will help guide the fishery’s future direction. Overall,
it is evident that all stakeholders would like a recovered fishery, yet some stakeholders
claim that this has already happened.
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Table 9. Participant Answers on Future Direction of the Fishery.
Question
The red snapper
recovery plan
sets a target
recovery for the
year 2032; what
is the most
effective path to
achieve this
recovery goal
and a
sustainable red
snapper fishery?

Answers

Institute tag
system for
private
recreational
sector
Regional
management
(state
management)
Different
management
plans for each
sector

Number of Stakeholders Stakeholder Groups

7/15 (47%)

Charter/Commercial
Fishermen, Seafood
Dealer, Commercial
Fishing Organization
Representative,
Environmental Non-Profit
Organization
Representative, Federal
Agency Employee

1/15 (7%)

State Agency Employee

2/15 (13%)

Get
recreational
sector into
system of
accountability

5/15 (33%)

Stick to
rebuilding plan

4/15 (27%)

Collect better
data

5/15 (33%)
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Environmental Non-Profit
Organization
Representatives
Federal Agency
Employees, Commercial
Fisherman, Commercial
Fishing Organization
Representative, Seafood
Dealer,
Charter/Commercial
Fisherman
Federal Agency
Employees,
Environmental Non-Profit
Organization, State
Agency Employee,
Charter/Commercial
Fisherman
Recreational Fishing
Organization, Commercial
Fisherman, Commercial
Fishing Organization,
Seafood Dealer,
Environmental Non-Profit
Organization
Representative

Stakeholder Division
It is clear that each stakeholder has a distinct perspective of what is happening in
the Gulf’s red snapper fishery. For example, several stakeholders argued upfront that they
think states are better at managing natural resources than the federal government.
According to one director of a state marine resource agency, “The states really do a good
job at managing other fisheries, like red drum, Spanish mackerel, sheepshead, flounder;
you know, we manage all those fisheries as individual states and do a good job and make
sure those are not being overfished as a whole, so I don’t think red snapper will be any
different.” One recreational organization representative added that, “The states have a lot
of experience managing recreational fisheries where the federal government does not.”
States and recreational advocacy groups (ASA and CCA) often use red drum as a shining
example of successful state management, however commercial take for this species is
prohibited (Williamson, 2008). Similar to red snapper, red drum was overfished in the
late 1980s and federal authorities instituted several emergency closures to reduce fishing
pressure. In 1987, the Gulf Council created a fishery management plan prohibiting
commercial fishing, leaving only recreational fishermen. Using a fishery that entirely
eliminated the commercial sector is hardly an example of successful management for a
multi-use fishery.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, a few stakeholders observed that the federal
government is better than states at fisheries management. One federal scientist drew
attention to the obvious: “I mean in general, there’s a few things where history has shown
that federal management performs better than individual state management and that’s
defense, transportation, and natural resources, because the states are sharing those things.
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So you need some higher arbitrating authorities.” Similarly, a dual-permitted fisherman
contends that “So looking at how the states have a current track record managing
fisheries is not that great, especially in a multiuse fishery.”
As seen above, there is a clear allegiance between states and recreational
fishermen/organizations, and the federal government and commercial/charter fishermen.
There is a mistrust of federal authority by recreational fishermen, resulting in suspicion of
data, a lack of cooperation, and a hesitation to participate in stakeholder processes. When
I asked one stakeholder why recreational fishermen do not trust the federal government,
he noted that,
Recreational fishermen look at [having less access with a recovered stock] and
think the federal government is trying to prevent us from fishing and so that’s the
mindset that’s among a lot of recreational fishermen is that this system has been
established to prevent recreational fishermen from being able to go and that
creates a lot of mistrust.
He also thinks that there is a feeling among recreational anglers that they are not being
listened to when they attend Gulf Council meetings and listening sessions. Because
recreational fishermen do not believe they are being listened to, they are less inclined to
participate in and cooperate with data collection efforts, which contributes to the current
crisis with recreational data. They are also less likely to trust federal reports and stock
assessments, believing that scientists are fabricating stock information. Congressman
Jolly also noted that recreational fishermen desire a more receptive audience at the Gulf
Council.
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Special interest groups that speak on behalf of recreational fishers, like the CCA
and ASA, are feeding dubious rhetoric to uninformed fishermen, deepening the schism
between the recreational sector and the federal government (Altman and Artiles, 2015;
CCA, 2017 and 2016). Bill Bird, chairman of the Coastal Conservation Association’s
National Government Relations Committee expressed his support for Congressman
Garret Graves and his aversion towards commercial fishermen in a television report
saying,
If you watch this series you know that the forces [commercial fishermen] trying
to take over public marine resources like red snapper for their own are not afraid
to target and take down any politician who opposes them. That makes what Rep.
Graves is doing by standing up to this corrupt system even more admirable.
Recreational anglers and the public at large owe him their utmost support as he
leads this charge
(Dute, 2015). The ASA also attacked current red snapper management declaring, “There
are many contributing factors that have resulted in the current state of unrest regarding
red snapper management, including overly rigid statutory requirements, inadequate stock
assessments, inaccurate angler harvest estimates, a refusal by managers to reexamine
allocations and the heavy influence of commercial fishing and environmental
organizations” (American Sportfishing Association, n.d.B). Such rhetoric only fosters
further mistrust of the NMFS and the peer reviewed studies they produce.
While recreational fishermen are frustrated with the NMFS, commercial
fishermen and other stakeholders are wary of states’ intentions. Because governors
appoint state commissioners, many stakeholders are worried that this allows political
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influence to infiltrate state management. Indeed, one environmental advocacy
organization employee added that “They’re going to have state bureaucrats beholding to
the governors of the states so I think you’re introducing a lot more politics into it.” A
commercial fishing organization director echoes this sentiment: “I’m just pointing out the
fact that the commissioners are appointed by the governor and there’s often times
perception that politics drives fisheries management at the state level.” In conclusion, an
environmental advocacy organization director stated the obvious: “The management is
not consistent across states. Within the states, it is easier for special interest groups to
assert undue influence than it is at the federal level.”
Although the state proposal declares that states will be held accountable by the
GSRSMA, and they will request intervention from the U.S. Secretary of Commerce if
necessary, states now routinely ignore season length suggestions made by the Council.
State recreational fishing seasons for red snapper in state waters have been lengthened
out of opposition to the federal management’s choice to shorten seasons in federal waters,
leading recreational fishermen to overfish their quota. States have not held recreational
fishers accountable and the federal government only recently began implementing
accountability measures. The commercial fishermen I spoke with argue that this is unfair
because they have made efforts to be compliant, while recreational fishers are damaging
the progress they have made to establish a sustainable fishery. The lack of cooperation
and defiance of federal rules and guidelines by the states only creates more division
within the fishery.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Through this research it is apparent that the red snapper fishery’s issues are
mostly social and political, and less biological or managerial. Some stakeholders are
engaged in a fight to expand access because they think red snapper has recovered—or
they think the federal government should not be telling them what to do. As one state
scientist put it, “A problem still to be resolved, really, is this different perceptions of what
is success in managing red snapper…So, getting this issue resolved is still very much
needed, but it’s something that is going to be handled much more from that socialeconomic perspective than from the biological/scientific perspective, because it
transcends, really, just the biological state of the stock.”
Although there have been many biological studies of the red snapper stock, few
have investigated the social framework of the fishery. This study examines how the
fishery’s social dynamics have led to a split between recreational and commercial fishers.
Federal authorities are clearly trying to limit fishing pressure in order to restore the Gulf’s
red snapper stock. The relatively modest numbers of commercial fishermen who are still
in business accept the federal government’s stock assessments and IFQ program as a way
to rebuild stocks, while the more numerous recreational anglers (~3.1 million) continue
their fight for increased fishing opportunity by rejecting the federal government’s
scientific stock assessments and pressuring state governments to take their side.
Stakeholders provided insight into the shortcomings and strengths of the current
management regime and offered their opinions on a possible state takeover. Overall, the
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results reveal a clear divide in the fishery, with some strongly opposing state
management, and others very supportive of such a possibility. Dual-permitted fishermen,
NGO environmental advocacy organizations, commercial fishing organizations, and
federal and state scientists, all fear a state takeover would lead to a setback in the red
snapper stock rebuilding progress. It is widely believed states will increase access and
soften regulations, ultimately jeopardizing the health of the red snapper stock. Proponents
of the state takeover bill are convinced the stock is currently at a level that would allow
for flexible regulations, including eliminating catch buffers and extending season lengths,
even if they offer no evidence for this belief.
Despite the social differences of stakeholders, participants unanimously agreed
that the red snapper fishery management plan abides by the national standards of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act. The MSA has guided fisheries management for the past 40 years,
using an unbiased, scientifically peer reviewed process to analyze the health of the
nation’s fisheries. H.R. 3094, The Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act,
violates the very principles that established the current fisheries management system in
the U.S. Many stakeholders are concerned that a divergence from the MSA and Regional
Council process could result in the elimination of stakeholder involvement in decisionmaking. The states desire to take away management authority from the NMFS, an agency
responsible for the prioritizing recovery of the stock, and one that invites a diversity of
perspectives in the policy making process, is concerning to those that believe in the
integrity of science and stakeholder participation. H.R. 3094 is a dangerous piece of
legislation not only to the health of the red snapper stock, but also to the existence of
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public access to seafood through commercial fishing operations. Results show that 12/158
participants from stakeholder groups including environmental advocacy organizations,
dual-permitted fishermen, seafood dealer, and federal scientists, and Congressman Jolly,
do not support a state takeover.
Biological assessments of the red snapper indicate the stock is recovering
according to schedule, with an increase in total biomass. However, the reports also
suggest the stock’s skewed age variation (relatively few mature fish in the stock) needs
improvement in order to be fully recovered. Spawning potential ratio is also not quite
high enough to support an increase in fishing pressure. Current science suggests that the
stock is not fully recovered and cannot sustain the increased access desired by the Gulf
States without reducing the commercial sector’s quota—and H.R. 3094 calls for such a
reduction.
Because the red snapper is such a popular species, many eyes are on the
management choices of authorities. The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council,
under the NMFS’s guidance, is attempting to restore a fishery by using the best science
available. While it is true that there is some controversy over the amount of recreational
fish catch, and fisheries scientists are the first to admit that their assessments are not
perfect, those favoring state takeover of the fishery appear to believe that red snapper has
recovered and that access should increase, even if it means reducing commercial fishing.
However, issues within the fishery are much deeper than the health of the stock; division
amongst the sectors and stakeholders has caused wild variation in the length of seasons in
state waters, very short seasons in federal waters, data contribution obstruction, a lack of
8

Ratio does not include Congressman Jolly.
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trust and competing claims by many stakeholders, and no accountability for recreational
anglers.
When the Gulf States first proposed taking over the red snapper fishery,
supporters claimed that regional management would offer the benefit of local knowledge.
Yet, it is evident that the Gulf States proposal never collected the input of all stakeholders
involved in the red snapper fishery. Despite Congressman Graves’ claims that he invited
all involved to comment, many stakeholders have no such recollection. This research has
led me to believe that the states are proposing a takeover for ideological reasons, such as
increased access, reduced federal control, and maximum flexibility. The state takeover is
not grounded in sound science, nor will it promote a sustainable red snapper fishery.
Effective renewable, natural resource management must allow as much access as possible
while ensuring that the resource remains no less plentiful for future generations.
Conservation of threatened species requires restraint, in the form of limited access to
diminished or recovering resources. Conflict over natural resource use is common, but
resource users must agree on what constitutes facts and best scientific judgment.
It may be that many recreational anglers continue to find fish, however that does
not mean that a fish stock is healthy. This can be seen in the case of the Newfoundland
cod fishery off the southeast Canadian coast (Hilborn and Hilborn, 2012). One year there
appeared to be plenty of fish (probably because harvesters knew where to look for the last
few fish) and the next year there were no fish to be found: the fishery collapsed. By the
time Canada could institute conservation management measures it was too late. The U.S.
government is trying to practice proactive resource management, balancing the needs of
the resource, commercial fishermen, and the range of recreational anglers.
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The conflict over the Gulf’s red snapper fishery mirrors the tension between state
and federal governments over natural resource management throughout the United States.
As with the Sagebrush Rebellion from several decades ago, the Gulf States Red Snapper
Management Authority Act calls for greater state control in the Gulf of Mexico and
increased fishing opportunity for recreational fishers. The bill first appeared in July 2015,
yet it did not pass. Representative Garret Graves intends to reintroduce the bill and
believes it will be easier to pass now that fellow Republicans control Congress and the
White House (Wietecha, 2017).
Both the Sagebrush Rebellion and the Red Snapper Saga emerged out of growing
frustration with reduced access to natural resources managed by the federal government.
As seen with the Sagebrush rebels, private recreational fishermen have reacted to a
conservation issue with a rights based argument, contending that the Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Management Council is taking away their “right” to fish. The Sagebrush
Rebellion was a symbol of ranchers’ dissatisfaction with federal management after a long
period of lax regulation (Nelson, 1984). The Graves bill emerged out of similar
dissatisfaction with the Gulf Council’s effort to reduce overfishing of red snapper by
applying stringent regulations. Unexamined in this study, but perhaps no less important,
are the role of population growth in the Gulf States, a dramatic increase in the region’s
recreational anglers over the past several decades, and the impact of improved fishing
technology that makes recreational fishers increasingly efficient—all of which have
undoubtedly contributed to reduced red snapper and increased conflict over access to the
resource.
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In conclusion, Congressman Garret Graves sponsors H.R. 3094 The Gulf States
Red Snapper Management Authority Act on behalf of the private recreational fishing
community because he believes that recreational fishing opportunity should not be
limited. Because of fundamentally different natural resource management ideologies,
recreational fishermen (working through the states) and federal employees have reached a
crossroads where they no longer agree on the direction of the red snapper fishery or even
basic facts regarding the condition of the fishery. Recreational fishermen have confidence
that the tenets of the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation will successfully
guide fisheries management, partly because this ideology condemns the commercial
sector (market) and advocates for open access. It is evident from the proposed bill and
rhetoric by state employees and private recreational fishermen that they desire a red
snapper fishery with lenient management, open access, and no commercial sector. The
Gulf States believe they are better fit to manage red snapper, however stock assessments
suggest federal management, under the guidelines of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, has
improved the stock’s health, increasing biomass and enhancing the reproductive rate of
the population (Figure 11). Indeed, as a result of this management, the total allowable
catch (TAC) has increased from 4 million pounds in (1991) to almost 13 million pounds
in (2014)—and if the stock continues to improve, the TAC will continue to increase
(Figure 12).
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This study improves understanding of the current social/political climate of the
red snapper fishery and the management choices of the NMFS. The firsthand accounts in
this study provide a window into stakeholders’ perceptions of the current state of the
fishery and the future of red snapper. They also offer management personnel detailed
accounts of what user groups find to be the biggest problems in the fishery, including
data collection, accountability, and division within the fishery.
Limitations and Future Research
Like most studies, this one suffers from some important limitations. For example,
I reached out to many stakeholders but the response rate was low and even fewer people
agreed to interviews. This may be because of the controversy surrounding the red snapper
and the possibility that stakeholder representatives are wary of offering their opinions for
fear of backlash or misrepresenting their employers/agency affiliations. Despite relying
on few participants, the people interviewed for this study are highly regarded in their
fields and offered opinions that aligned with the stakeholder groups they represented.
Additionally, I supplemented the shortage of interview data with articles from special
interest groups’ websites and op-eds in newspapers and publications. Another weakness
of the study was the limited number of questions asked. I asked participants only eight
questions to allow for detailed answers. In hindsight, I should have asked more questions
about specific policies and amendments, for example, the IFQ system or the
accountability measures enacted with the 2006 MSA reauthorization.
Future research should further examine the social dynamics of the recreational
sector of the red snapper fishery by speaking with recreational fishermen from each Gulf
state to explore their diverse fishing cultures. In addition, researchers should study the
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history of the rift between commercial and recreational sectors, starting with the
implementation of the IFQ program in 2007. Some participants hinted that the IFQ
program marks the beginning of the tension between commercial and recreational fishers.
Furthermore, a more detailed study of Gulf State population and recreational fisher
increase—and the role of technology in recreational fishing—would help illustrate how
these factors contribute increased pressure on red snapper. Finally, a further analysis of
stock assessments and fisheries data would also be advised when the next stock
assessment is released in 2017 to evaluate progress towards rebuilding goals.
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Appendix (continued)

Dear (Participant Name),

Date xx/xx/xx

Hello, my name is Sydney Alhale and I am a graduate student at USF St.
Petersburg. I am writing to request your participation in my research study about red
snapper management in the Gulf of Mexico. My goal is to learn more about state and
federal management of red snapper. I would like to interview you because of your
knowledge and/or involvement in the red snapper fishery.
I will be conducting interviews in person, or via phone, email or Skype based on
your availability. If you accept the invitation to participate in an interview, I hope it will
be acceptable for me to follow up with you on occasion if I require further clarification as
I conduct analysis. Interviews will consist of several questions and take no more than an
hour to complete.
Potential benefits from participating in the study include having a platform to
voice your concerns about management decisions, as well as a chance to clarify any
perceived misunderstandings. Your participation in the study will further the
understanding of red snapper management and likely improve awareness of the fisheries
management decision-making process.
If you have any concerns or questions about the study or your rights as a research
participant, please do not hesitate to contact me. My email is sydneyalhale@mail.usf.edu.
Your participation in this study is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw from the
research process at any point during the study—just let me know. Please let me know if
you accept the invitation to participate as soon as possible so I can schedule an
appointment with you in the near future.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Sydney Alhale, Master of Science candidate
sydneyalhale@mail.usf.edu
IRB# 27225
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Interview Outline
Subjects To Cover:
• Magnuson-Stevens Act
• Red Snapper Management Authority Act
• States’ Interests
• Management Mechanisms
o Stock Assessments
o Data Collection
o IFQ Program
o Council Amendments
• Commercial vs. Recreational
Interview Questions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. My goal is to learn more about state
and federal management of Red Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. My questions are
designed to get a sense of how the social components of the fishery affect the decisionmaking process and management.
Later on I will ask you some questions to which you may respond. But first, I’d like to
learn more about you.
0. Before we start remind me again:
•
•
•

Your place of work and job title?
How long you have worked there?
Your main responsibilities at your job?

1. Magnuson-Stevens Act
1a.1. How well do you think the red snapper Fishery Management Plan abides
by/executes the national standards set forth by the Magnuson-Stevens Act?
2. Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority Act
2a.1. What are the benefits of transferring management to the five Gulf states (FL,
AL, LA, MS, TX)?
2b.1. The Gulf States say they will use flexible management approaches to manage
red snapper; what are some challenges with managing one stock of fish with five
different management authorities?
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3. States’ Interests
3a.1. It has been reported many times that the states’ main interest is improving
access to the red snapper stock; how do you think the states, if put in charge, will
ensure that increased access will not result in increased overfishing?
4. Management Mechanisms
4a. Stock Assessments
4a.1. What improvements should be made to stock assessment analysis to ensure
allocations are based on the most up to date stock information?
4b. Data Collection
4b.1. Estimates of the recreational catch of red snapper come from a combination of
results from three surveys: (1) the Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP),
conducted by the NOAA Fisheries (NMFS), (2) the Texas Marine Sport-Harvest
Monitoring Program by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) and (3)
the Southeast Region Headboat Survey (SRHS) conducted by NMFS, Southeast
Fisheries Science Center, Beaufort, NC. What is your opinion on combining various
data collection methods to estimate the state of the red snapper stock?
4c. Council Amendments
4c.1. How has the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council handled the
responsibility of rebuilding the red snapper stock?
5. Commercial and Recreational
5a.1. The red snapper recovery plan sets a target recovery for the year 2032; what is
the most effective path to achieving this recovery goal and a sustainable red snapper
fishery?
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Study ID:Pro00027225 Date Approved: 7/27/2016 Expiration Date: 7/27/2017

Informed Consent to Participate in Research Involving Minimal Risk
Pro # 27225
You are being asked to take part in a research study. Research studies include only people
who choose to take part. This document is called an informed consent form. Please read
this information carefully and take your time making your decision. Ask the researcher or
study staff to discuss this consent form with you, please ask him/her to explain any words
or information you do not clearly understand. The nature of the study, risks,
inconveniences, discomforts, and other important information about the study are listed
below.
We are asking you to take part in a research study called:
"Who Should Manage Red Snapper (Lutjanus campechanus) in the Gulf of
Mexico?"
The person who is in charge of this research study is Sydney Alhale. This person is called
the Principal Investigator. However, other research staff may be involved and can act on
behalf of the person in charge. She is being guided in this research by Dr. Christopher
Meindl.
The research will be conducted at USF St. Petersburg or at the office of participants or by
telephone or email.
Purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to further understand state and federal management of Red
Snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. The study is designed to gain a sense of how the social
components of the fishery affect the management decisions.

Why are you being asked to take part?
We are asking you to take part in this research study because you have knowledge of
fisheries management and may be involved in decision-making processes related to red
snapper.
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Study Procedures:
If you take part in this study, you will be asked to:
• Answer a number of questions related to red snapper management and fisheries
management.
• Only participate in one interview, no longer than 2 hours, however you may be
contacted for follow up questions and clarifications.
• Be audio-recorded for transcription purposes, however if you are uncomfortable
with being recorded you may ask not to be. Only I will have access to the audio
records, however a transcription service will be used to convert audio to interview
transcripts. Only my committee and I will see the interview transcripts.
• The audiotapes and interview records will be kept a minimum of 5 years after the
Final Report is submitted to IRB. The records will be destroyed when this time is
up through file deletion and shredding of documents.
Alternatives / Voluntary Participation / Withdrawal
You do not have to participate in this research study.
You should only take part in this study if you want to volunteer. You should not feel that
there is any pressure to take part in the study. You are free to participate in this research
or withdraw at any time. There will be no penalty or loss of benefits you are entitled to
receive if you stop taking part in this study.
Benefits
You will receive no benefit(s) by participating in this research study.
Risks or Discomfort
This research is considered to be minimal risk. That means that the risks associated with
this study are the same as what you face every day. There are no known additional risks
to those who take part in this study.
Compensation
You will receive no payment or other compensation for taking part in this study.
Costs
It will not cost you anything to take part in the study.
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Privacy and Confidentiality
We will keep your study records private and confidential. Certain people may need to
see your study records. Anyone who looks at your records must keep them confidential.
These individuals include:
•

The research team, including the Principal Investigator (Sydney Alhale) and
faculty advisor (Dr. Christopher Meindl).

•

Certain government and university people who need to know more about the
study, and individuals who provide oversight to ensure that we are doing the
study in the right way.

•

Any agency of the federal, state, or local government that regulates this
research (Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)).

•

The USF Institutional Review Board (IRB) and related staff who have
oversight responsibilities for this study, including staff in USF Research
Integrity and Compliance.

We may publish what we learn from this study. If we do, we will not include your name.
We will not publish anything that would let people know who you are.
You can get the answers to your questions, concerns, or complaints
If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this study, or experience an
unanticipated problem, call Sydney Alhale at 954-XXX-XXXX.
If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this study, or have complaints,
concerns or issues you want to discuss with someone outside the research, call the USF
IRB at (813) 974-5638 or contact by email at RSCH-IRB@usf.edu.
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Consent to Take Part in this Research Study
I freely give my consent to take part in this study. I understand that by signing this form I
am agreeing to take part in research. I have received a copy of this form to take with me.
_____________________________________________
Signature of Person Taking Part in Study

____________
Date

_____________________________________________
Printed Name of Person Taking Part in Study
Statement of Person Obtaining Informed Consent
I have carefully explained to the person taking part in the study what he or she can expect
from their participation. I confirm that this research subject speaks the language that was
used to explain this research and is receiving an informed consent form in their primary
language. This research subject has provided legally effective informed consent.
_____________________________________________________________________
Signature of Person obtaining Informed Consent
Date
_____________________________________________________________________
Printed Name of Person Obtaining Informed Consent
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Appendix B:
H.R. 3094 Text, FMP Amendments (1984-2016)
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Union Calendar No. 664
114th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 3094

[Report No. 114-851]

To amend the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
to transfer to States the authority to manage red snapper fisheries in
the Gulf of Mexico.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 16, 2015

Mr. Graves of Louisiana (for himself, Mr. Miller of Florida, Mr.
Richmond, Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Mr.
Boustany, Mr. Abraham, Mr. Palazzo, Mr. Wittman, Mr. Olson, Mr. Gene
Green of Texas, Mr. Westmoreland, Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, Mr.
Benishek, Mr. Jody B. Hice of Georgia, Mr. Long, Mr. Babin, Mr. Cook,
Mr. Walz, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Latta, and Mr. Carter of Georgia) introduced
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the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural
Resources

December 8, 2016

Additional sponsors: Mr. Tom Price of Georgia, Ms. Bordallo, Mr.
Collins of Georgia, Mr. Loudermilk, Mr. Allen, Mr. Graves of Georgia,
Mr. Westerman, Mr. Gohmert, Mr. Farenthold, Mr. Hinojosa, Mr. Carter of
Texas, Mr. Zinke, Mrs. Lummis, Mr. Mooney of West Virginia, Mr. Denham,
Mr. Clay, Mr. Thompson of Pennsylvania, Mr. LaHood, Mr. Labrador, Mr.
Gosar, and Mr. Hardy
Deleted sponsor: Mr. Mica (added October 21, 2015; deleted December 10,
2015)

December 8, 2016

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on July
16, 2015]

_______________________________________________________________________
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A BILL

To amend the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
to transfer to States the authority to manage red snapper fisheries in
the Gulf of Mexico.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Gulf States Red Snapper Management
Authority Act''.

SEC. 2. TRANSFER TO STATES OF MANAGEMENT OF RED SNAPPER
FISHERIES IN
THE GULF OF MEXICO.
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(a) In General.--The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:

``TITLE V--TRANSFER TO STATES OF MANAGEMENT OF RED SNAPPER
FISHERIES IN
THE GULF OF MEXICO

``SEC. 501. DEFINITIONS.

``In this title:
``(1) Coastal waters.--The term `coastal waters' means all
waters of the Gulf of Mexico-``(A) shoreward of the baseline from which the
territorial sea of the United States is measured; and
``(B) seaward from the baseline described in
subparagraph (A) to the outer boundary of the exclusive
economic zone.
``(2) Gulf coastal state.--The term `Gulf coastal State'
means each of the following States:
``(A) Alabama.
``(B) Florida.
``(C) Louisiana.
``(D) Mississippi.
``(E) Texas.
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``(3) Gulf of mexico fishery management council.--The term
`Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council' means the Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council established under section
302(a).
``(4) Gulf of mexico red snapper.--The term `Gulf of Mexico
red snapper' means members of stocks or populations of the
species Lutjanus campechanus, which ordinarily are found within
the waters of the exclusive economic zone and adjacent
territorial waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
``(5) Gulf states red snapper management authority.--The
term `Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority' and
`GSRSMA', means the Gulf States Red Snapper Management
Authority established under section 502(a).
``(6) Red snapper fishery management plan.--The term `red
snapper fishery management plan' means a plan created by one or
more Gulf coastal States to manage Gulf of Mexico red snapper
in the coastal waters adjacent to such State or States,
respectively.
``(7) Reef fish federal fishery management plan.--The term
`Reef Fish Federal fishery management plan' means the Fishery
Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of
Mexico, as amended, prepared by the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council pursuant to title III and implemented under
part 622 of title 50, Code of Federal Regulations (or similar
successor regulation).
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``(8) State territorial waters.--The term `State
territorial waters', with respect to a Gulf coastal State,
means the waters adjacent to such State seaward to the line
three marine leagues seaward from the baseline from which of
the territorial sea of the United States is measured.

``SEC. 502. MANAGEMENT OF GULF OF MEXICO RED SNAPPER.

``(a) Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority.-``(1) Requirement to establish.--Not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this title, the Secretary
shall establish a Gulf States Red Snapper Management Authority
that consists of the principal fisheries manager of each of the
Gulf coastal States.
``(2) Duties.--The duties of the GSRSMA are as follows:
``(A) To review and approve red snapper fishery
management plans, as set out in the Act.
``(B) To provide standards for each Gulf coastal
State to use in developing fishery management measures
to sustainably manage Gulf of Mexico red snapper in the
coastal waters adjacent to such State.
``(C) To the maximum extent practicable, make
scientific data, stock assessments and other scientific
information upon which fishery management plans are
based available to the public for inspection prior to
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meetings described in paragraph (c)(2).
``(b) Requirement for Plans.-``(1) Deadline for submission of plans.--The GSRSMA shall
establish a deadline for each Gulf coastal State to submit to
the GSRSMA a red snapper fishery management plan for such
State.
``(2) Consistency with federal fishery management plans.-To the extent practicable, the Gulf Coastal States fishery
management plans shall be consistent with the requirements in
section 303(a) of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1853(a)).
``(c) Review and Approval of Plans.-``(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this title and not more than 60 days after one
or more Gulf coastal States submits a red snapper fishery
management plan and annually thereafter, the GSRSMA shall
review and approve by majority vote the red snapper fishery
management plan if such plan meets the requirements of this
title.
``(2) Public participation.--Prior to approving a red
snapper fishery management plan submitted by one or more Gulf
coastal States, the GSRSMA shall provide an adequate
opportunity for public participation, including-``(A) at least 1 public hearing held in each
respective Gulf coastal State; and
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``(B) procedures for submitting written comments to
GSRSMA on the fishery management plan.
``(3) Plan requirements.--A red snapper fishery management
plan submitted by one or more Gulf coastal States shall-``(A) contain standards and procedures for the
long-term sustainability of Gulf of Mexico red snapper
based on the best available science;
``(B) comply with the standards described in
subsection (a)(2)(B); and
``(C) determine quotas for the red snapper fishery
in the coastal waters adjacent to such Gulf coastal
State or States, respectively, based on stock
assessments, and-``(i) any recommendation by the GSRSMA to
reduce quota apportioned to the commercial
sector by more than 10 percent shall be
reviewed and approved by the Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Management Council;
``(ii) during the 3-year period beginning
on the date of enactment of this title and
consistent with subsection (d), the GSRSMA
shall not determine a quota apportioned to the
commercial sector; and
``(iii) nothing in this Act shall be
construed to change the individual quota shares
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currently in place in the commercial sector of
the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery.
``(4) Review and approval.--Not later than 60 days after
the date the GSRSMA receives a red snapper fishery management
plan from one or more Gulf coastal State or States, the GSRSMA
shall review and approve such plan if such plan satisfies the
requirements of subsection (b).
``(d) Continued Management by the Secretary.--During the 3-year
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this title, the
Secretary, in coordination with the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council, shall continue to manage the commercial sector of the Gulf of
Mexico red snapper fishery.
``(e) Reporting Requirements.-``(1) Reports by gulf coastal states.--Each Gulf coastal
State shall submit to the GSRSMA an annual report on the status
of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery in coastal waters
adjacent to such State.
``(2) Report by the gsrsma.--Not less often than once every
5 years, the GSRSMA shall use the information submitted in the
annual reports required by paragraph (1) to prepare and submit
to the Secretary a report on the status of the Gulf of Mexico
red snapper fishery.

``SEC. 503. STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RED SNAPPER FISHERY
MANAGEMENT
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PLANS.

``(a) Allocation of Management to the Gulf States.-``(1) Certification of approved plans.--The GSRSMA shall
certify to the Secretary that a red snapper fishery management
plan is approved under section 502 for each of the Gulf coastal
States.
``(2) Transfer of management.--Upon receipt of the
certification described in paragraph (1) and subject to section
502(d), the Secretary shall-``(A) publish a notice in the Federal Register
revoking the regulations and portions of the Reef Fish
Federal fishery management plan that are in conflict
with any red snapper fishery management plan approved
by the GSRSMA; and
``(B) transfer management of Gulf of Mexico red
snapper to the GSRSMA.
``(b) Implementation.-``(1) In general.--Upon the transfer of management
described in subsection (a)(2)(B) and subject to section
502(d), each Gulf coastal State shall implement and enforce the
red snapper fishery management plans approved under section 502
for the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery in the coastal
waters adjacent to each Gulf coastal State.
``(2) Failure to transfer management.--If the certification
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described in subsection (a)(1) is not made the transfer of
management described in subsection (a)(2)(B) may not be
accomplished and the Secretary shall remain responsible for
management of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper.

``SEC. 504. OVERSIGHT OF GULF OF MEXICO RED SNAPPER MANAGEMENT.

``(a) Implementation and Enforcement of Fishery Management Plans.-Not later than December 1 of the year following the transfer of
management described in section 503(a)(2), and at any other time the
GSRSMA considers appropriate after that date, the GSRSMA shall
determine if-``(1) each Gulf coastal State has fully adopted and
implemented the red snapper fishery management plan approved
under section 502 for such State;
``(2) each such plan continues to be in compliance with the
standards for sustainability provided by the GSRSMA pursuant to
section 502(a)(2); and
``(3) the enforcement of the plan by each Gulf coastal
State is satisfactory to maintain the long-term sustainability
and abundance of Gulf of Mexico red snapper.
``(b) Overfishing and Rebuilding Plans.-``(1) Certification.--If the Gulf of Mexico red snapper in
the coastal waters adjacent to a Gulf coastal State is
experiencing overfishing or is subject to a rebuilding plan,
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such Gulf coastal State shall submit a certification to the
GSRSMA showing that such State has implemented the necessary
measures to end overfishing or rebuild the fishery.
``(2) Notification to secretary.--If, after such time as
determined by the GSRSMA, a Gulf coastal State that submitted a
certification under paragraph (1) has not implemented the
measures and requirements described in such paragraph, the
GSRSMA shall vote on whether to notify the Secretary of a
recommendation of closure of the red snapper fishery in the
waters adjacent to the State territorial waters of the Gulf
coastal State.
``(c) Closure of the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Fishery.-``(1) Conditions for closure.--Not later than 60 days after
the receipt of a notice under subsection (b)(2) for a Gulf
coastal State, the Secretary may declare a closure of the Gulf
of Mexico red snapper fishery within the waters adjacent to the
State territorial waters of the Gulf coastal State.
``(2) Considerations.--Prior to making a declaration under
paragraph (2), the Secretary shall consider the comments of
such Gulf coastal State and the GSRSMA.
``(3) Actions prohibited during closure.--During a closure
of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery under paragraph (1),
it is unlawful for any person-``(A) to engage in fishing for Gulf of Mexico red
snapper within the waters adjacent to the State
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territorial waters of the Gulf coastal State covered by
the closure;
``(B) to land, or attempt to land, the Gulf of
Mexico red snapper in the area of the closure; or
``(C) to fail to return to the water any Gulf of
Mexico red snapper caught in the area of the closure
that are incidental to commercial harvest or in the
recreational fisheries.
``(4) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to allow the Secretary to close the red snapper
fishery in the State territorial waters of a Gulf coastal
State.

``SEC. 505. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDING.

``No Federal funds are authorized to be appropriated to or used for
the GSRSMA or its members to carry out management actions of red
snapper in the Gulf of Mexico.

``SEC. 506. NO EFFECT ON MANAGEMENT OF SHRIMP FISHERIES IN
FEDERAL
WATERS.

``(a) Bycatch Reduction Devices.--Nothing in this title may be
construed to effect any requirement related to the use of Gulf of
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Mexico red snapper bycatch reduction devices in the course of shrimp
trawl fishing activity.
``(b) Bycatch of Red Snapper.--Nothing in this title shall be
construed to apply to or affect in any manner the Federal management of
commercial shrimp fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico, including any
incidental catch of red snapper.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.-(1) Data collection.--Section 401(g)(3)(C) of the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C.
1881(g)(3)(C)) is amended by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end of clause (iv), by striking the period at
the end of clause (v) and inserting ``; and'', and by adding at
the end the following:
``(vi) in the case of each fishery in the
Gulf of Mexico, taking into consideration all
data collection activities related to fishery
effort that are undertaken by the marine
resources division of each relevant State of
the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council.''.
(2) Gulf state territorial waters.--Section 306(b) of the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16
U.S.C. 1856(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(4) Notwithstanding section 3(11) and subsection (a) of this
section, for purposes of carrying out activities pursuant to the
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Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of
Mexico, the seaward boundary of a coastal State in the Gulf of Mexico
is a line three marine leagues seaward from the baseline from which the
territorial sea of the United States is measured.''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of such Act is amended by adding at the end the following:

``TITLE V--TRANSFER TO STATES OF MANAGEMENT OF RED SNAPPER
FISHERIES IN
THE GULF OF MEXICO

``Sec. 501. Definitions.
``Sec. 502. Management of Gulf of Mexico red snapper.
``Sec. 503. State implementation of the red snapper fishery management
plans.
``Sec. 504. Oversight of Gulf of Mexico red snapper management.
``Sec. 505. Prohibition on Federal funding.
``Sec. 506. No effect on management of shrimp fisheries in Federal
waters.''.
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A BILL

To amend the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
to transfer to States the authority to manage red snapper fisheries in
the Gulf of Mexico.
_____________________________________________________________________
December 8, 2016

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
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Red Snapper Fishery Management Plan Amendments

Year

Action
Description
1984 Reef Fish FMP created Establishes 13 in. minimum
TL
1990 Amendment 1
7 fish bag limit; 3.1mp
commercial quota
1991 Amendment 3
Revise TAC framework to be
more flexible; established 2007
recovery goal
1991 Reg Amendment

2.04 mp commercial quota;
1.96 mp recreational allocation

1992 Amendment 4

Moratorium on new reef fish
commercial permits for 3 years

1993 Reg Amendment

3.06 mp commercial quota;
2.94 recreational allocation;
restrict commercial vessels to
landing one trip limit per day

1993 Amendment 6

Extended commercial 200 lb
limit for permit holders
without endorsement

1994 Amendment 5

Raise min. size limit from 14
to 16 in. over 5 yr. period
Retain 6 million lb TAC and
commercial trip limits; reduce
daily bag limit from 7 to 5 fish;
increase min. size limit from
14 to 15 in.

1994 Reg Amendment

1994 Amendment 7
1995 Reg Amendment

Establish dealer reporting
Raise TAC from 6 mp to 9.12
mp
Establish limited entry
commercial program (ITQ);
Extend moratorium on the
issuance of new reef fish
permits

1994 Amendment 9
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1995 Amendment 8

Attempted to establish ITQ
system, shut down by
Congress

1996 Reg Amendment

Split commercial quota into
spring and fall season
Extend endorsement system
through 1996
NMFS disapproves provisions
to cancel the automatic
commercial size limit increases
to 15 in. TL in 96 and 16 in.
TL in 97

1996 Amendment 13
1997 Amendment 12

1997 Reg Amendment

Change recreational allocation
to a quota
Cancel planned increase min.
size limit to 16 in. TL
Establish two tier red snapper
license limitation system
(Class 1 and Class 2)

1997 Reg Amendment
1998 Amendment 15

1998 Reg Amendment

Maintain 9.12 mp TAC; zero
bag limit for captian and crew
of for-hire rec. vessels

1998 Reg Amendment

Reduce bag limit to 4 fish and
zero fish for caption and crew
of for-hire vessels; reduce min.
size limit to 14 in. TL

2000 Amendment 17

Extend reef fish permit
moratorium for another 5 yrs.
Maintain TAC at 9.12 mp for
next 2 yrs.; increase min. size
limit from 15 to 16 in. TL; set
rec. bag limit to 4 fish; retain
comm min. size limit at 15 in.
TL

2000 Reg Amendment
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2003 Amendment 20

Establish 3 yr. moratorium on
charter vessel/headboat
permits for vessels fishing the
EEZ or Gulf of Mexico for
reef fish; allow permits to be
transferable to other persons;
require vessel captains or
vessel owners to participate in
data collection surveys as a
permit condition

2005 Amendment 22

Establish status determination
criteria and biological
reference points; establish red
snapper rebuilding plan;
establish additional reef fish
bycatch reporting methods

2005 Amendment 24

Extend comm permit
moratorium indefinitely, unless
replaced with comprehensive
controlled access system

2006 Amendment 25

Extend rec for-hire reef fish
permit moratorium indefintely,
unless limited access system
created

2006 Amendment 26

Establish IFQ program for
commercial red snapper
fishery
Reduce commercial quota to
2.55 mp; reduce recreational
quota to 2.45 mp; reduce rec
bag limit to 2 fish and bag
limit for caption and crew of
for-hire vessels to zero; reduce
comm min. size limit to 13 in.
TL

2007 Amendment 27

121

2008 Amendment 29

Establishes landing
requirements and allocation
transfer procedures for
commercial red snapper IFQ
program

2010 Reg Amendment

Sets TAC for 2011 to 6.945
mp; commercial quota is 3.542
mp and recreational is 3.403
mp

2011 Reg Amendment

Sets quotas for 2011:
commercial quota to 3.664 mp
and recreational quota to 3.521
mp

2012 Reg Amendment

Sets quotas for 2012:
commercial quota to 4.121 mp
and recreational quota to 3.959
mp; Sets Anticipated TAC for
2013: commercial quota to
4.432 mp and recreational
quota to 4.258 mp

2013 Framework Action

Sets quotas for 2013:
commercial quota to 4.315 mp
and recreational quota to 4.145
mp; Sets recreational bag limit
to 2 fish in EEZ

Sep-13 Framework Action

Increases quotas for 2013:
Increases commercial quota by
1.295 mp and recreational
quota by 1.245 mp

2015 Framework Action

Establish recreational ACT
with 20% buffer applied to
quota of 4.312 mp; recreational
season lenghts determined
based on when rec ACT will
be met, not when quota is met
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2015 Amendment 40

Creates sector separation in
recreational sector: federal forhire vessels (FFH) (further
divided into charterboats and
headboats) and private rec
anglers (PRA); FFH quota set
to 42.3% and PRA quota set to
57.7% of the recreational
allocation; establishes 3 year
sunset provision on sector
separation and associated
mgmt measures

May-15 Framework Action

Sets quotas for 2015:
commercial quota to 7.293 mp
and recreational quota to 7.007
mp; Sets quotas for 2016:
commercial quota to 7.12 mp
and recreational quota to 6.84
mp; Sets quotas for 2017 and
subsequent years: commercial
quota to 7.007 mp and
recreational quota to 6.733;
The FFH and PRA quota,
respectively, are: 2.964 mp and
4.043 mp for 2015; 2.893 mp
and 3.947 mp for 2016; 2.848
mp and 3.885 mp for 2017.

Nov-15 Framework Action

Withholds 4.9% of 2016
commercial quota prior to the
annual distribution of
allocation to the IFQ program
shareholders
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2016 Amendment 28

Revises allocations to 48.5%
for commercial sector and
51.5% for recreational sector;
Given the red snapper stock
ACLs of 13.96 mp for the
2016 fishing year and 13.74
mp for the 2017 fishing year;
revises commercial quota to
6.768 mp and 6.664 mp and
recreational quota to 7.192 mp
and 7.076 mp for the 2016 and
2017 fishing years
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